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Resumo 
 
O aumento constante da população mundial e os constantes avanços tecnológicos, que ori-
ginam novas soluções e equipamentos que se tornam indispensáveis no dia-a-dia do ser humano, 
fazem com que exista um considerável aumento do consumo de energia elétrica. É, portanto, 
essencial que se utilize este recurso da forma mais eficiente possível e de forma a que este chegue 
a todos com segurança.  
Atualmente começa a surgir a necessidade de criar infraestruturas resilientes para que haja 
a capacidade de garantir o normal funcionamento destas após um fenómeno adverso de forma a 
que infraestruturas e sistemas dos quais dependemos não sejam comprometidos. Este problema 
aplica-se a infraestruturas que providenciam serviços essenciais no dia-a-dia de uma sociedade, 
como no caso de estudo específico, um Data Center. Nestes casos, o seu correto funcionamento 
é essencial em alturas de crise a empresas de tecnologia e outras entidades que fornecem serviços 
a outras empresas ou ao utilizador comum. 
No seguimento deste problema, surge o tema desta dissertação, cuja implementação foi 
realizada em contexto empresarial. É, então, proposta uma metodologia que permite quantificar 
e avaliar o impacto que uma falha de um equipamento teve numa determinada infraestrutura, 
tendo em conta a sua importância e o tempo que demorou a sua resolução, e descrevê-lo de uma 
forma simples e de fácil compreensão. Isto pode ser útil para todos aqueles que no futuro tiverem 
necessidade de recorrer ao histórico de eventos, críticos e não-críticos, dessa infraestrutura. Para 
obter um valor quantitativo, recorrer-se-á a uma métrica que tenha em consideração as caracte-
rísticas técnicas da infraestrutura analisada. 
Estas empresas precisam de se manter competitivas perante o seu publico alvo para que 
possam prosperar no mercado e é essencial que consigam perceber como agir perante uma falha 
num equipamento, ou componente, sem descurar a parte económica visto que todas as decisões 
tomadas a partir desse momento devem ter como objetivo voltar ao estado anterior ao evento da 
forma mais rápida possível. Existe, portanto, a necessidade de perceber o impacto que uma falha 
pode ter numa infraestrutura para que se possa atuar de acordo com a sua gravidade.  
Nos testes realizados concluiu-se que o sistema forneceu valores que permitiam ordenar os 
eventos ocorridos ao longo de um ano de acordo com o seu real impacto e as simulações efetuadas 
a componentes escolhidos de forma aleatória ia de acordo ao que se pretendia.  
 
Palavras chave: Resiliência, Infraestruturas Críticas, Processo de Poisson, Failure Modes Effect 
Analysis. 
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Abstract 
 
The constant growth in world population and the constant technological advances, which 
lead to new equipment and solutions that become indispensable in the daily life of human beings, 
created a considerable increase in electricity's consumption. It is, therefore, essential to use this 
resource as efficiently as possible and in a way that reaches everyone safely. 
The need for resilient infrastructures is now emerging so that there is the ability to ensure 
their normal functioning after an adverse phenomenon so that the infrastructures and systems we 
depend on are not compromised. This problem applies to infrastructures that provide essential 
services on a day-to-day basis to the society, such as in this specific case study, a Data Center. In 
these cases, proper functioning is essential in times of crisis to technology companies and other 
entities that provide services to other companies or the average user. 
Following this problem arises the theme of this dissertation, whose implementation was 
carried out in a business context. A methodology is then proposed to quantify and evaluate the 
impact that an equipment's failure had on a given infrastructure, taking into consideration its im-
portance and the time taken to resolve it, in a simple and easy to understand manner. This would 
be useful for all those who in the future need to recur to a detailed historical data, of critical and 
non-critical events, of this infrastructure. To obtain a quantitative value, a metric that considers 
the technical characteristics of the analyzed infrastructure will be used. 
These companies need to remain competitive with their target audience so that they can 
thrive in today's market. It is essential that they can understand how to deal with a failure in an 
equipment or component without neglecting the economic side since all decisions made thereafter 
should aim to return to the pre-event state as quickly as possible. There is, therefore, a need to 
understand the impact that a failure can have on an infrastructure to act accordingly to its severity. 
In the carried-out tests, it was concluded that the system provided values that allowed to 
order the events that occurred over a year according to their real impact and the simulations per-
formed on randomly selected components were as intended. 
 
Keywords: Resilience, Critical Infrastructures, Poisson Process, Failure Modes Effect Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter is intended to make known what is going to be said throughout 
the dissertation, the problem to be solved and the importance of the solution to be developed. 
Immediately after that, the objectives that need to be fulfilled will be presented.  
1.1. Motivation 
Electricity is, today, a necessity. It is a resource that we use every day to work, to move 
around and to communicate. It is necessary in our homes, in our work or study places and in our 
devices. For those reasons the use of energy has been increasing. However, our most used sources 
of energy are finite, and their use in an excessive way can lead to have serious environmental 
issues. Energy consumption has increased significantly as reflected in the increase in CO2 emis-
sions, as shown in figure 1, and the demand for energy on a global scale is growing, with an 
increase of more than 40% between 2015-2030. According to the World Energy Outlook Special 
Report, "Having remained broadly stable at around 4 Gt for much of the 1980s and 1990s, CO2 
emissions from industry have increased by 38% since the early 2000s, to reach 5.5 Gt.”[1]. Also, 
emerging countries are approaching the consumption levels of developed countries, which means 
that the values of CO2 emissions will increase even more was we may confirm with the world 
atmospheric concentration of C02 values demonstrated in figure 1. Also, world population is also 
increasing which can deteriorate these numbers even more. 
It is therefore very important that we begin to use energy in an intelligent and, above all, 
efficient way. According to [2], “Energy efficiency is a way of managing and restraining the 
growth in energy consumption. Something is more energy efficient if it delivers more services for 
the same energy input, or the same services for less energy input”. Basically, using less energy 
to provide the same service, which can be achieved by recurring to new technologies and new 
processes. 
1 
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Figure 1 - World atmospheric concentration of CO2 and average global Temperature Change [1] 
Using energy efficiently reduces greenhouse gas production and is a cheaper, faster and 
cleaner way to contain climate change. We can, therefore, conclude that by increasing energy 
efficiency we are in the right direction towards reducing, or at least not increasing the negative 
impacts on man-made climate change over the last few years, but that is not enough. 
Another way to respond to this threat is to use renewable energy resources, as they are 
clean, avoid the emission of greenhouse gases and endless since they depend on natural resources. 
However, in the center of a city (which are currently some of the most energy-demanding places) 
the only source of energy that would be viable would be solar energy. Today, these types of 
technologies are more developed, more efficient and can be installed on the top of buildings, or 
other areas usually unimpeded and unused. 
However, adding Solar Panels it is not enough. Improving our current buildings in order 
to use energy in an intelligent and efficient way it is also necessary. And it is in this sense that 
new measures and concepts such as the Net Zero Energy Building (NZEB) arises. The European 
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) requires that from 1 January 2019 on new 
public buildings, and from 1 January 2021 on new private buildings, the concept of NZEB is to 
be implemented. 
In reference [3], authors use the general definition for Zero Energy Building (ZEB) given 
by The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Building Technologies Program: “A net zero-energy 
building (ZEB) is a residential or commercial building with greatly reduced energy needs through 
efficiency gains such that the balance of energy needs can be supplied with renewable technolo-
gies.” Still, a NZEB is a complex concept and contains very varied terms and expressions and a 
NZEB definition can vary according to the author of the study, the article or even the country. 
However, implementing it will not be easy. For a building to be considered NZEB it must 
follow to technical rules and standards. These require an advanced and specialized workforce and 
some of these rules may vary from country to country. The reference [4], draws attention to the 
fact that the workforce does not have the required know-how to carry out these changes in existing 
buildings or in new buildings. In addition, as new NZEB buildings begin to emerge, and even 
when photovoltaic panels are installed in older buildings, new grid problems may arise leading to 
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grid faults that often affect the population either through a localized fault or a large-scale fault. 
Problems may arise in buildings and facilities owned or operated by the energy operator, or hu-
man errors, though, it is also prudent to think that this type of fault can occur due to different 
natural phenomena. As an example, the hurricane Sandy that occurred in the United States of 
America and caused serious problems in the electrical network [5] or even by the hurricane Leslie 
that devastated the region of Aveiro, Portugal, in 2018. All of the factors described above have 
brought new challenges and problems that enable power outages. 
But the hypotheses of having to adapt to hurricanes and different atmospheric phenomena 
should be equated. Reference [6] explicitly says “While hurricanes occur naturally, human-
caused climate change is supercharging them and exacerbating the risk of major damage.” It 
also notes that the number of storms is increasing which means that there is a necessity to adapt 
and to build more resilient infrastructure so that we can be prepared for a catastrophe. As Figure 
1 shows, global temperatures are rising throughout the years, research presented in [7] has shown 
that increasingly violent storms will likely continue assaulting our coasts stating that "severe 
storms will increase in a warmer environment"  and "Thunderstorms typically occur in the warm-
est season of the year".  
It is of utmost importance to learn how to adapt our infrastructures to ensure they are 
resilient in future climate disasters such as extreme heat, heavy rain, and drought.  All the afore-
mentioned disasters can change the way we think and idealize our cities, but that does not mean 
we should not create new ways to adapt to these problems without taking advantage of these new 
adaptations. In the United States, in one of New York's borough, Staten Island, a new project is 
beginning to take the form to create a Seawall which can withstand the massive waves by possible 
future thunderstorms [8]. They do not only need to "withstand the prolonged barrage of pounding 
waves" but "they are considered vital to protect land and property that would otherwise be swept 
out to sea". However, it will have a public walkway and the "boardwalk will be big enough to 
host concerts, carnivals, marathons, and cultural events" according to the governor's office. Even 
though its prime goal is to shield people from a natural disaster, it can have other purposes. 
Climate change is unpredictable, and it is as we know a continuous, worsening crisis. 
Resiliency is the idea that a city can respond to any type of threat without neglecting safeness and 
the enjoyment of a city. Power Outages can affect services that society takes for granted on a day-
to-day basis, such as public transportation, public lighting, buildings of public interest (such as 
sports stadiums), factory industry or even hospitals and some of these infrastructures are essential 
to a country’s normal functioning. Their disruption, in certain cases, should not happen at any 
cost and that is why some of them have some redundancy or emergency systems implemented to 
prevent such problems from happening.  
In this sense, it is important to ensure that the Power Grid is resilient and that there is a 
rapid response in the event of a failure, in order to minimize the service replacement time as well 
as the number of consumers affected. A resilient power system can be the path to prevent and 
respond to a low-probability, high loss event because it is not possible to foretell all the events 
that can and do occur in a short and long term future [9]. 
 
 4 
 
 
Figure 2 - Power outage causes for 140 worldwide outage data  [9] 
All those events may jeopardize not only public services that we rely on a daily basis but 
also companies, industries, and factories that need to be more competitive in today's global mar-
ket. These companies need to improve and develop internally in order to "be dynamic and flexible 
and meet the ongoing changes" [10], to deal with the severity of competition and to increase 
customers’ expectations creating a new commitment to eliminate product defects and make up 
for any kind of shortage and deviations in its performance.  
For example, the fact that many telecommunication companies are currently implementing 
the fifth-generation cellular network technology, or 5G, which brings higher speeds, no interfer-
ences, and brings the ability to control machines, external devices, and other objects, is a chal-
lenge since all this technology makes it necessary to upgrade existing telecommunications infra-
structures to accommodate it. One of the goals of the 5G network is to address some of the obsta-
cles associated with the Internet of Things (IoT). The fact that IoT is increasingly common means 
that there is a need to create a more resilient infrastructure to all kinds of phenomena, as it implies 
digital interconnection to everyday objects with the Internet.  
There has also been the massification of cloud storage services such as Google Drive and 
Dropbox, which ensure fast and uninterrupted access to information stored by the average user as 
long as there is an Internet connection. All this information is stored in Data Centers. The number 
of such infrastructures is growing, and they have the ability to provide other services to companies 
and institutions that have to remain uninterrupted at all costs. However, the possibility of a Data 
Center failure can be very hurtful not only to the company responsible for managing that infra-
structure but also to companies that depend on that Data Center to access information or to pro-
vide services to third parties. Therefore, the need to make them more resilient arises. Due to this, 
there is a need to meet the interests of consumers who increasingly rely on these technologies for 
personal and professional purposes. 
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According to figure 2 approximately 30% of power outages derived from natural disasters 
and 48% derived from equipment failures, thus, having resilient critical infrastructures is becom-
ing a common goal for many countries and entities. These infrastructures also have to be reliable 
but that may not be enough, regarding hospitals and telecommunications infrastructures, for ex-
ample, since these mechanisms cannot fail at times of greater need. Also, lots of infrastructures 
are interdependent, which means that bigger importance to this matter must be given since the 
failing of infrastructure can prejudice others creating the possibility of a domino effect. 
1.2. Goals 
This dissertation has as main objective to create a methodology, that analyzes the failures 
and or incidents in a critical infrastructure and quantifies them, characterizing disruptive events 
by the level of urgency, and has the ability to report the event as soon as possible. To do so, some 
metrics will be used in order to get to a more conclusive result. 
This type of methodology is going to be implemented in a Data Center and it is important 
nowadays because it allows an analyst, a manager or the “decision maker” to be able to respond 
to problems or failures that were unpredictable or some abnormal phenomena that may damage 
or jeopardize some sections of an infrastructure. This methodology also attempts to create an 
indicator that gives support in the decision-making process after a critical or non-critical event. 
It is also important that this tool is able to provide targets according to the expected per-
formance of an infrastructure, giving important information to the performance evaluation of it.  
1.2.1. Main Contributions 
This methodology does not exist in this company and will be implemented primarily on 
an infrastructure of major importance. It will be able to provide a value of the impact that an event 
has had on the infrastructure, considering some characteristics that were previously defined and 
characteristics that will be introduced at the time of evaluation. If the design and implementation 
of this system is successful, the company intends to implement this system in the remaining in-
frastructures, thus creating a more detailed historical data of it. This system also allows setting 
quantitative targets to be met by the infrastructure management and maintenance teams, providing 
an important tool for mitigating the impact of the events. 
1.2.2. The Document's Structure 
This Document's structure comprises 6 chapters (introduction, four core chapters and 
conclusion). The remain chapters are structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2: State of the Art - This chapter involves researching sources and articles, 
by other authors, demonstrating what already exists and what has been implemented, 
associated with the dissertation's theme. Explored topics include the definition of re-
silience itself, with some of its challenges, metrics, and processes for achieving it, and 
the idea of critical structures that are of major importance today and create serious 
challenges for the future. 
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• Chapter 3: Development - This phase tries to explain which were the first steps, and 
their pre-requisites, used to implement this methodology and provides detailed infor-
mation of every step taken to address this challenge. 
• Chapter 4: Implementation - This chapter describes the infrastructure in which this 
work is going to be implemented and will also prove whether the chosen metric is 
applicable or not. All steps and decisions taken will be described in detail. 
• Chapter 5: Results Analysis - It presents and analyses the obtained results from pre-
vious critical events in order to understand if they match what is intended. Some sim-
ulations are going to be realized in order to double-check whether the final values are 
consistent or not. 
• Chapter 6: Conclusions - Finally, some conclusions and a brief resume about the 
carried-out work are going to be presented. It will provide an overview of the activities 
and steps developed throughout this dissertation in addition to a description of con-
cepts and techniques aimed at improving this project methodology and implementa-
tion. 
 
  
 7 
 
 
2. State of the Art 
This chapter is going to dissert about the necessary definitions and concepts to understand 
the problem and to comprehend some of the issues that the industry has encountered throughout 
recent years and continues to face in the present. Initially, some importance is going to be given 
to the power grid infrastructure resilience since this infrastructure is crucial for providing constant 
power to other buildings. However, in the case of industrial complexes (that can go from industrial 
factories to communications compounds, like a Data Center) a bigger importance can be given 
since it depends on a constant Power Supply to feed all their components and important machinery 
contained within. Some of the solutions found and what can be done to prevent and to manage 
some fails will be presented. All this information is of the utmost importance to develop the pro-
posed methodology. 
2.1. Resilience, what is it? 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, resilience is defined as: "The capacity to recover 
quickly from difficulties; toughness" or "The ability of a substance or object to spring back into 
shape; elasticity". These definitions does not differ much in the field of engineering with the 
example implied in reference [11] which says: “The common use of resilience word implies the 
ability of an entity or system to return to normal condition after the occurrence of an event that 
disrupts its state. Such a broad definition applies to such diverse fields as ecology, materials 
science, psychology, economics, and engineering. “ 
In engineering, the term "resilience" is used to determine the ability to prepare and adapt 
to changes in conditions and to quickly resist and recover from breakdowns, system failures, de-
liberate attacks, accidents, threats or natural disasters. Resilience should not be viewed as a sub-
stitute for infrastructure protection, but rather as a field in which it is important to invest and to 
improve, with measures that increase the agility of systems so that they are able to adapt and 
recover and as an object that is designed to foster system-wide investment strategies. 
The electrical network can be used as an example. This industry has evolved considerably 
over the last century, with successive investments made over time by different entities, allowing 
2 
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the network to develop and become safer while guaranteeing a higher quality service to all its 
users. Those facts have to be confirmed by some reliability indexes such as the System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) which measures the total duration of an interruption for the 
average customer during a given time period and the Customer Average Interruption Frequency 
Index (CAIFI) which measures the average number of interruptions per customer interrupted per 
year [12]. Some of this indexes can evaluate the duration, the frequency, the number of customers 
interrupted and measure the availability of the service and the need for better indicators which 
ultimately implies a greater development by companies in safer and more innovative solutions, 
thus obtaining better results in terms of their ability to support, respond and recover from a dis-
ruptive event, as shown in the next image. 
 
Figure 3 - The steps of a resilient Electrical System through a disruption event  [9] 
The Resilience Triangle, as is shown in figure 3, is according to [10] a “tool developed in 
the field of civil engineering, with the objective of modeling the loss of resilience of a given struc-
ture during and after the occurrence of a disruption such as an earthquake.” This figure also 
shows the different phases that may occur after a disruptive event: 
1. Anticipate & Prepare: Refers to the period before a disruption. Companies and entities should 
anticipate and prepare for any event to decrease both the likelihood and the impact of a risk; 
2. Disruption: the moment in which a disruptive event takes place. If the disruption is not in-
stantaneous, it may take some time to fully take place; 
3. Resist & Absorb: the time that elapses between the beginning of the disruption and the end 
of it. While in some cases it can be abrupt, in others it may take some time to see the entire 
impact of the disruption 
4. Response & Adapt: the initial response to the event, where measures are presented to control 
and prevent further damage; 
5. Restoration Strategy and Recover: the first action by the affected entities in order to resume 
activities and go back to previous levels as soon as possible; 
6. Final Operation Mode: the final state of the affected entity after all repairs and corrections. It 
should be noted that the final performance of equipment or building after reparations may be 
worse than before disruption (as shown in figure 3), equal or better depending on the correc-
tions and solutions found. A similar description of this and the previous steps is also found 
on [13]. 
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It is though very important to make a distinction between reliability and resilience. Ac-
cording to [14], resilience consists of low probability, high impact events and are more related to 
infrastructure recovery time. On the other hand, Reliability consists in High probability, low im-
pact events that are more related with customer interruption time.  And, while these two defini-
tions are connected, it is also important to refer that a “resilient grid is not necessarily one that is 
reliable and a reliable one is not necessarily resilient” [15]. It is important to remember this since 
it can be easily adapted to an infrastructure or a component. This article also states that these 
definitions are important to guarantee that the entities responsible for the Power Grid can provide 
a quality service to everyone. Therefore, they have to be reliable, to deliver power in a consistent 
manner with as few disruptions as possible, and resilient, to prevent from possible rolling brown-
outs or possible cyber-threats. 
It also refers to the importance of distinguishing blackouts from disasters saying: “A 
blackout occurs when a large proportion of a power grid is disabled by a combination of un-
planned contingencies, resulting in a temporary power interruption." A disaster can relate to an 
event that was not expected and can create unavailability in a large section of the network. This 
type of events usually includes a blackout because of the destruction created. A power system 
that is reliable and well projected should be able to diminish the impact of the power disruption 
and should recover promptly from a blackout. So, being reliable to the blackouts that happen the 
most and resilient to events that do not happen much is of the utmost importance to ensure that 
the impact of any event is somewhat mitigated. 
Infrastructure resilience is different from infrastructure security. While one is aimed at 
ensuring that infrastructure continues to meet the needs and assets of the community and all those 
who depend on it, infrastructure security is more related to preventing the occurrence of disruptive 
events in the future. 
It could be considered that ideal resilience metrics would be obtained through retrospec-
tive and prospective analyzes, highly informative and with direct and consistent data. However, 
there are several trade-offs. Anyone who is analyzing the behaviors should consider which are 
the objectives of the analysis and what resources are available. It may be more interesting for the 
operator to use some metrics that are targeted at threats or to use widely-available metrics for the 
purpose of investing or planning an operational response to certain events or occurrences [5]. 
Achieving the resilience of a power grid has become a high priority for many countries 
in recent years to ensure a continuous power supply in certain areas. There are some measures 
that can be taken before, during and after a disruptive event that can make a difference at a time 
like this since it is not known when such an event can occur [9]. Also, the fact that the infrastruc-
ture is aging does not help. The document released by The White House explicitly says that in 
America “The aging infrastructure is considered as the main cause for the power outages in the 
United States” [16]. Therefore, to modernize the infrastructure is of the utmost importance to 
everyone involved.   
Reference [14] proposes some measures to make the Power Grid more resilient, for ex-
ample: 
• Move the distribution and transmission lines to the underground; 
• Upgrade the poles and other structures with stronger and more robust materials; 
• Elevating substations; 
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• Relocating facilities to areas less prone to extreme weather; 
• Reroute the transmission lines to areas less affected by weather; 
• Create Redundant transmission routes. 
Some of these measures are important to create a more sturdy, resourceful and flexible 
infrastructure, though some of it are not economically viable. In the case of moving distribution 
and transmission lines underground, the investment is too big, and the response and restoration 
time can be very time-consuming because of “the inability of the repair crews to visually detect 
damaged components”. 
However, this article leaves an important question, “Should we build a stronger and big-
ger grid or a smarter one?”. By investing in a bigger and stronger network, with measures to 
improve robustness, the final result is a grid that is both reliable and resilient but too expensive 
and probably not cost-effective. It is therefore important to create a network that has smart solu-
tions to provide continuous monitoring by the operator and control tools that can deal with some 
of the unexpected events in an efficient way. Creating Microgrids or Distributed Energy Systems 
are some of the measures proposed in [14].  
This same question could be applied to an engineer in an initial phase of the conception 
and design of a building communications system: "Is it better to build an internal communications 
network with the latest and more advanced technologies, the fastest communication cables, with 
network connectors and signal amplifiers in almost every division, and create alternate signal 
routes to have a more safer and prone to failures network or is it better to study a more cost-
effective and smarter solution that can do almost the same job but at smaller price?" It all depends 
on the budget and the final utility of this network system. A Grid Dispatch Center, for example, 
is more likely to need a more reliable and faster communication network than a personal domestic 
network. 
2.2. Solutions and Improvement Methods 
Applying solutions, using more resistant materials or control methods allows making a 
Power Network more resistant to possible disruptions that are becoming more frequent and more 
devastating. However, this brings significant challenges because the solutions applied in one 
place may not be feasible in another to make the grid more resilient and more efficient in the face 
of the possibility of critical events. Reference [9] clearly states that the best way to increase resil-
ience lies in investing in system hardening and operational resilience strategies such as smart 
grids and distribution system resilience frameworks. Some of the hardening measures were al-
ready presented in the section 2.1 but it is important to refer that these measures may improve the 
durability and resilience of the infrastructure, but they are not resistant to every type of event.  
A Smart Grid is a good solution to improve and to locate possible power failures and 
blackouts in an area which can be isolated and then rerouted to the power supply. It also gives the 
chance to maintain the power supply to critical customers or infrastructures. Therefore, [9] pro-
poses a resilient load restoration algorithm in the distribution system through a backup Distributed 
Generator. Once there is a fault on a line, the radial topology of the network will partition into 
several islands separated by the faulted components, creating islands that are provided by distrib-
uted generators and others that are in a blackout. After identifying, locating and isolating the faults 
provoked by a disruptive event the restoration will occur. 
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A study, [17], conducted in Germany that indicates the experiences and challenges of 
integrating photovoltaic systems into the voltage grid shows that “improved grid planning 
measures lead to a better use of the available low-voltage grid capacity” which gives a bigger 
importance to implementing some of the measures mentioned in the previous points. It is, there-
fore, important to implement some measures to improve the network considering technical, eco-
nomical and local factors such as the average power installed by each residence and the distance 
between residences that can bring problems in the low voltage network and geographical reasons. 
The solutions presented by this study were separated in three categories: Grid Optimization; Clas-
sic Grid Expansion Measures and the use of intelligent operating equipment. 
2.2.1. Grid Optimization Measures 
According to this study, the “Grid optimization measures represent the most economical 
initial step and include, for instance, changes in grid structure and wide-area control”. So, [17] 
presents the following measures: individual tap changing of distribution transformers, wide-area 
control (for example, set the voltage of the transformers dynamically depending on the load situ-
ation), reactive power feed-in through photovoltaic inverters to maintain the voltage range in the 
Low Voltage Grid and changing the grid topology (to closed ring grid, for example) which re-
duces grid resistance, therefore reducing the voltage drop in the grid. All these measures are im-
portant to the distributor because they allow for better operation of the network and they can suit 
the voltage levels or load wanted to their need. The introduction of capacitor batteries into the 
Power Transformers is also benefiting not only the operator but also the owner of a complex that 
depends on internal Power Transformers because it reduces Joule losses. These solutions are ca-
pable of reducing both reactive energy losses and active energy losses considerably. 
 
Figure 4 - A Representation of a parallel power line [17]  
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2.2.2. Classic Grid Expansion Measures 
The main reason for the network expansion measures is to ensure compliance between 
the allowable limits for voltage and current. However, they remain viable solutions to some of 
the network problems. As measures to expand the Grid, the document proposes: replacing the 
local distribution transformer (to follow the rise of Photovoltaics), segmenting the local grid (to 
not exceed the capacity of the transformer), laying parallel cables (like the example presented in 
figure 4 to solve current or voltage issues that may come with cross-section of a cable), increasing 
the conductor cross-section (to reduce the voltage drop in the lines and to increase the current 
carrying capacity). 
2.2.3. Use of intelligent operating equipment 
These systems are relatively recent and “present an economical alternative to classic grid 
expansion measures”. The authors present Voltage Regulators, to raise or lower the voltage levels 
according to the distributers needs, and Voltage-regulated local distribution transformers, to ad-
just the voltage ratio automatically without interrupting the Power Line. The first example is also 
pointed out as an economical and technological alternative to a classic expansion measure. The 
second example has the advantage of giving the possibility to maintain the low-voltage side of 
the transformer constant even when the voltage in the medium side increases. 
2.3. Steps, Metrics and Measure to Achieve Resilience 
To try to assess the resilience level of a network, some articles propose metrics or steps 
that can be used to try to evaluate the state of the network after a disruptive event. These metrics 
and methodologies should help companies, services and entities to better plan and respond to 
adverse events that at the present time are not addressed. 
 Reference [11] presents some metrics present in several studies that evaluate in a more 
quantitative way the performance of the system. Reference [18] suggests the use of agents to 
implement metrics because it enables to control physical and cyber systems. Reference [5] pro-
poses the use of a framework to develop metrics to analyze the electricity grid and other energy 
sectors. Therefore, processes that can contribute to increasing the resilience of infrastructures and 
the development of adequate metrics, and metrics that can achieve a deterministic value of resil-
ience lost will be presented. 
2.3.1. Resilience Analysis Process 
The Resilience Analysis Process was proposed in [19] “as method for the assessment of 
baseline resilience and evaluation of resilience improvements.” This system uses the outputs 
from system models and historical data as the basis to create and develop grid resilience metrics 
for the power grid and other energy sectors and to obtain a response plan for the network.  
This system is based in seven steps, as shown in figure 5, so that those who have the 
power to decide can assess the state of the system to later identify and analyze, through the pro-
posals included in this model, which are the best strategies to increase resilience. 
According to the system, these measures should be based on the performance demon-
strated by the power systems and not by their attributes and they should quantify the outcomes of 
a stress situation or a disruption in the power grid which can be measured by the power not 
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delivered after a disruptive event, cost of recovery to the utility, population or service assets with-
out power, among others.  
It is important to refer that, according to [5], the proposed metrics are: Risk-Based since 
they include threat, vulnerability, and consequence as factors, to quantify the resilience of a sys-
tem; Relatively Complex because the metrics are probabilistic and rely on stochastic models of 
grid operations that can be time and data consuming; Forward-looking considering that it recurs 
to metrics to project consequences for potential and future hazards; Broadly informative, the re-
sulting metrics can provide information that can be essential long-term planning or investment; 
and More consistent, it relies on computational models to increase the consistency of the metrics. 
 
Figure 5 - The Resilience Analysis Process. Figure based on a graph present in E.Vugrin, 2017  [5] 
2.3.1.1. Define Resilience Goals 
Defining and specifying the Resilience Goals is the first step to establish the basis for all 
the following steps. It is important to discuss and determine whether the main goal is to assess 
the resilience of a power system due to previous events or evaluate possible system improve-
ments. If the latter is chosen, a decision must be made about the considered changes and the types 
of questions the analysis should address. It is also necessary to know which are the characteristics 
of the infrastructure (geographic boundaries, physical and operational components, relevant time 
periods, etc.) where the goals will be applied and if there are any possible conflicting goals. Both 
reports, [5] and [19], leave these three examples as “high-level goal language appropriate at this 
step of the process: 
• Improving a regional electric grid’s resilience to natural disasters; 
• Deciding how to allocate a pipeline’s capital investment and maintenance budget; 
• Ensuring availability of power to medical or transportation systems during disasters.” 
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2.3.1.2. Define Consequence Categories and Resilience Metrics 
The second step is to define the consequence categories and resilient metrics that serve 
as the basis for this process and these must reflect the resilience goals previously chosen. In some 
cases, outcome estimates and resilience metrics may focus on impacts recorded directly by an 
entity (undelivered energy, loss of revenue, cost of recovery, etc.), although, in some cases, direct 
impacts are part of the resilience assessment process. The Metrics that are selected should be 
specific enough to enable decision-making, whether for operational or planning purposes. The 
document [5] also presents a connection between consequence categories and the metrics that 
should be taken. The consequences and metrics should take into consideration spatial and tem-
poral dimensions and the data that it is available. Table 1 gives some examples of consequence 
categories and their resilience metrics. 
Table 1 - Examples of Consequence Categories for Consideration in Grid Resilience [5] 
Consequence Category Resilience Metric 
Direct 
Electrical Service 
Cumulative customer-hours of outages 
Cumulative customer energy demand not 
served 
Average number (or percentage) of customers 
experiencing outage during a specified time pe-
riod 
Critical Electrical Service 
 Cumulative critical customer-hours of outages  
 Critical customer energy demand not served 
 Average number (or percentage) of critical 
loads that experience an outage 
Restoration 
 Time to recovery 
 Cost of recovery 
Monetary 
 Loss of utility revenue 
 Cost of grid damages (e.g. repair or replace 
lines, transformers) 
 Cost of recovery 
 Avoided outage cost 
Indirect 
Community Function 
 Critical services without power (e.g., hospitals, 
fire stations, police stations) 
 Critical services without power for more than 
N hours (e.g. N > hours of back up fuel require-
ment)  
 Monetary 
 Loss of assets and perishables  
 Business interruption costs 
 Impact on Gross Municipal Product (GMP) or 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
 Other Critical assets 
 Key production facilities without power 
 Key military facilities without power 
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2.3.1.3. Characterize Hazards 
In this step it is important to specify the most concerning hazards, and their specifications, 
to try to minimize the consequences associated with those threats. It is of the maximum im-
portance to have a prioritized list of interests to take into consideration: the likelihood of a hazard 
or threat happening; to be aware of the serious consequences that will be faced; the resources and 
priorities to perform the analysis. This step can also involve the formulation of hazard scenarios 
(when considering uncertainty) that details specific hazard conditions. It is also crucial to under-
stand how the system should be able to absorb and adapt to different types of attacks or natural 
events. 
2.3.1.4. Determine Level of Disruption 
The fourth step specifies the level of structural damage, stress or other system impacts 
that the grid infrastructure and everything that is related is expected to endure under the hazard 
scenarios that were previously defined. This type of evaluation should be prepared to evaluate 
which infrastructures and properties are nonfunctional and degraded and to specify the severity 
of the damages and which are the necessary steps to obtain an overall system functionality. Now-
adays, some models are able to estimate the potential losses from those events. 
2.3.1.5. Collect Data via System Model or Other Means 
This step consists in collecting consequence data via system models or other means. All 
this information can be collected by gathering systems, like an Outage Management Systems 
(OMS) present in most utilities. There are system-level computer models which can provide nec-
essary power disruption estimates, when conducting forward-looking analyses. Recurring to data 
from communities describing the magnitude and duration of the disruption should be considered, 
in some cases. All this information can be used to evaluate how a system performs during a res-
toration period. 
2.3.1.6. Calculate Consequences and Resilience Metrics 
Calculating consequence estimates and resilience metrics is the next step. The system 
model outputs are converted to the resilience metrics defined during the second step. Resilience 
metrics can be consequence values, but in some cases, it may be preferable to combine it into a 
single value. It is possible to include uncertainty in the analysis and the system models are used 
to get multiple outcomes based on the previously characterized risks. It is also possible to include 
uncertainty in consequence estimates and resilience metrics by specifying the metrics statistical 
format. To define the uncertainty value, the statistical properties are used as: Quantiles (Confi-
dence Intervals); Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). 
2.3.1.7. Evaluate Resilience Improvements 
The seventh step has the goal of assessing the potential benefits and costs of the proposed 
resilience enhancing options. After accomplishing all the previous steps, it is now possible to 
evaluate the current network and define a baseline assessment of the resilience and then define 
what should be changed and where to invest in order to achieve a higher degree of resilience.  
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Another important test is to include the new modifications (for example, adding a redun-
dant power line or turning off equipment in advance of a storm) in the system configuration and 
then repeat the previous steps again so that the analysts can evaluate whether it is beneficial to 
invest in those new measures. It is also, mandatory to recalculate new consequence estimations 
and the resilience metrics to determine the benefits. 
2.3.2. Failure Modes, Effect Analysis  
Failure Modes, Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a method to "identify potential problems and 
prioritizing them so that you can begin to tackle or mitigate them" [20]. This method can catego-
rize an event so that the analyst or the manager can choose which is the best solution to an occur-
rence. Therefore, the main point of this "exercise" is to identify all the different failure modes that 
may occur and then evaluate the potentially damaging effects that these can create.  
As the title implies, this process can be divided into two parts: The Failure Modes and 
Effect Analysis: 
• Failure Modes – In any infrastructure, there are multiple things that can go wrong. 
All of those things are known as modes in the context of FMEA. It could be all kinds 
of failures that seem important to the designing team.  
• Effects Analysis – This topic refers to the effects of an element of the process failing 
and the effect on the outcome created by that failure on the company’s performance. 
It is important to investigate each failure and their causes to avoid or prevent, some 
situations in the future. 
This process characterizes each Failure Mode into three categories, with a range from 1 to 
10, that are described by [21] as:  
• S = Severity of Failure, can be described as the intensity of the effect of the failure or 
how severe a consequence can be;  
• O = Probability of Failure Occurrence (Frequency), is the possibility of occurrence of 
a potential cause or mechanism of failure or the frequency in which they occur;  
• D = Detectability of Failure (Ease of Detection), as the probability of detection of a 
fault by the operator or end-user or if it is easy to stop, to see or identify. 
All these variables are characterized in a scale from 1 to 10 like the one presented in table 2. 
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Table 2 - The range of every Variable of the FMEA Process 
Range 
Severity Scale (S) Occurrence Scale (O) Detection Certainty Scale (D) 
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rate Probability of Failure 
1 None <1 in 1,500,000 Almost certain 
2 Very Minor 1 in 150,000 Very High 
3 Minor 1 in 15,000 High 
4 Very Low 1 in 2,000 Moderately High 
5 Low 1 in 400 Moderate 
6 Moderate 1 in 80 Low 
7 High 1 in 20 Very Low 
8 Very High 1 in 8 Remote 
9 Extremely High 1 in 3 Very Remote 
10 Dangerously High >1 in 2 Almost Impossible 
 
As this table shows, every variable his evaluated from 1 to 10 creating 1000 different 
Risk Priority Numbers (RPN) since the end result corresponds to the multiplication of S, O, and 
D of each Failure mode: 
𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝑆 × 𝑂 × 𝐷     (1) 
Where: 
• 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = Risk Priority Number; 
• 𝑆 = Severity Scale; 
• 𝑂 = Occurrence Scale; 
• 𝐷 = Detection Certainty Scale. 
So, while a Failure Mode with a value closer to 1 is nearly impossible to happen and may 
not affect the performance, a Failure Mode with an RPN value closer to 1000 has an extremely 
high probability of failure which could injure a customer or an employee. 
So, by characterizing all the Failure Modes, it is, therefore, reasonable to prioritize them in 
order to face them, considering that the higher RPN value, the more unacceptable it is. With the 
priorities defined, a company or a team in charge of managing can begin to work through their 
list of potential process failures either one-by-one or in related groups, tackling the most danger-
ous problems first and the smaller ones last to try to minimize its exposure to risk as effectively 
as possible.   
To do it, it is almost mandatory to review as many components, assemblies, and subsys-
tems as possible to identify each possible failure mode, and their causes and effects. All of the 
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factors such as equipment, environment, materials, and human factors need to be considered, so, 
collecting accurate and thorough data on the project, analyzing documents, requirements, stand-
ards, the workplace and the conditions of working and interviewing informed and skilled people 
in the possible affected areas should be a priority to the team responsible for this task [21]. The 
flowchart, presented in figure 6, presents necessary steps for an FMEA implementation. However, 
this analysis may be further developed depending on whether or not the organization is interested 
in developing that infrastructure, its financial capacity and human resources.  
 
Figure 6 - A FMEA implementing cycle which carefully explains the necessary steps to apply this 
method. Figure based on a flowchart present in E. Pazireh, 2017.  [21] 
FMEA has been implemented since the 1950s in institutions such as the US Armed 
Forces, NASA, and companies such as Ford Motor Company and Peugeot-Citroen as a way to 
analyze products and industries. It is simple to use and offers an approach to quality engineering 
in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility of errors during the normal operation of the institu-
tion to which it was applied, reducing future errors. At first glance, it may seem that by instituting 
this process, problems will be solved temporarily. However, the main objective is to change the 
behavior of an institution in the face of certain events, so, the realization and execution of this 
method depends heavily on the members responsible for applying these changes. It is also 
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important to note that this process should always be regarded as a dynamic process meaning that 
it is important to revise it periodically to avoid increasing defects and to check if anything has 
changed [21]. 
2.3.3. The use of Agents 
According to [18], an agent has the capacity to make pre-programmed decisions since it 
uses artificial intelligence mechanisms. The fact that he is semi-autonomous gives him some au-
tonomy to decide what to do in certain situations. This point is important when it comes to resil-
ience since it allows an agent to be able to remain alert and respond to disturbances if it is neces-
sary. In order to do this, it is necessary to take into account some factors that can influence the 
final goals of an agent, such as: regulatory requirements of those who regulate this type of infra-
structures; what kind of performance do you want (if it is aimed at increasing the quality of the 
network or a more efficient system) and the actual physical limitations that exist when applying 
this type of solution. 
2.3.4. Quantitative Methods of Resilience Assessment 
As it was mentioned earlier in this document, it is necessary to recur to resilience metrics 
to decide (whether for operational or planning purposes) and to get to the pretended goals. To do 
that, it is important to choose the metrics that meet the fundamental necessities, whether the goal 
is to obtain a deterministic performance-based approach which does not contain uncertainty, a 
probabilistic approach which “captures the stochasticity associated with system behavior”[22], 
or if they are time dependent or not. These measures compare the performance of a system before 
and after a certain event.  
Reference [23] describes as “a deterministic static metric for measuring the resilience 
loss of a community to an earthquake”. The presented formula is: 
𝑅𝐿 = ∫ [100 − 𝑄(𝑡)]
𝑡1
𝑡0
 𝑑𝑡     (2) 
Where: 
• 𝑅𝐿 = Resilience Loss; 
• 𝑡1 = Time at which a community returns to his normal state; 
• 𝑡0 = Time at which a disruption starts; 
• 100 = Quality of the infrastructure before the disruption; 
• 𝑄(𝑡) = Quality of the infrastructure at a time t. 
This metric compares the quality of the infrastructure before and after the disruption as-
suming that the infrastructure is at 100% before the earthquake. The values obtained by this equa-
tion give a deterministic level of the resilience of the grid: A lower RL indicates a high resilience 
level and a high RL level indicates a lower resilience level. These results can be analyzed over 
time in a resilience triangle model. It is also possible to associate this metric with table 1, in the 
Restoration category since it considers the time of recovery as a resilience metric.   
Other authors, such as [24] , also use the resilience triangle model to calculate the resili-
ence level. That metric has as objective to calculate “the percentage of the total possible loss over 
some suitably long time interval 𝑇∗”. The formula is: 
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𝑅(𝑋, 𝑇) =
 𝑇∗−
𝑋𝑇
2
 𝑇∗
= 1 −
𝑋𝑇
2𝑇∗
     (3) 
Where: 
• 𝑅 = Resilience Loss; 
• 𝑋 = The percentage of functionality lost after a disruption (𝑋 ∈ [0,1]); 
• 𝑇 = Time required for a full recovery (𝑇 ∈ [0, 𝑇∗]); 
• 𝑇∗ = A long time interval in which the lost functionality is calculated; 
Both metrics are simple and give an idea of the time needed to recover the network to the 
levels registered prior to the disruption considering the lost functionalities and the recovery time 
to an equivalent level of "resilience". However, its linear recovery may not be realistic and the 
suggestion that the performance degradation after a disruption is immediate may not be valid to 
every system. 
 
Figure 7 - A example of the Resilience lost according to the expression (2)  [22] 
 
Figure 8 - A example of the Resilience lost according to the expression (3)  [22] 
Other author, [25], introduced local and global metrics that can be used to model the 
resilience of a public transportation safety system and air transportation systems, by the formula:  
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𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = ∫ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  ∫
𝑑𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 
𝑡𝑒
𝑡𝑏
𝑡𝑒
𝑡𝑏
  (4) 
 
Where: 
• 𝑡𝑏 = The time when the disturbance commences; 
• 𝑡𝑒 = The time when the disturbance ends; 
• 𝑆(𝑡) = The sum of factors that can affect the system safety. 
The last metric presented was proposed in [26]. This metric, like the first one presented, 
uses the Resilience triangle but considers past events (through a Poisson process that is going to 
be explained later) and the Non-Resilience per failure which gives it the ability to obtain safer 
and more reliable results. The developed formulas to obtain those values are: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑅𝑓) =
(𝑡𝑟−𝑡𝑖)(𝑄100−𝑄𝑟)
2𝑄100𝑡
   (5) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑅𝑒) = 1 − exp [−𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅)] + exp[−𝜆𝑡]   (6) 
 Where: 
• 𝜆 = The rate of a Poisson Process; 
• 𝑡 = Planning Horizon; 
• 𝑝 = Probability of a failure; 
• 𝑅𝑓 = Resilience per Failure; 
• 𝑡𝑟 = Time to recovery; 
• 𝑡𝑖 = Time of incident; 
• 𝑄100 = Capacity of the system; 
• 𝑄𝑟 = Robustness of the system; 
2.4. Critical Infrastructure 
According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [27], a “Critical energy or 
electric infrastructure is a system or asset of the bulk-power system, (physical or virtual) that 
would be negatively affected by his incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect: 
national security; economic security; public health or safety or any combination of such matters.” 
Currently there are services and sites that require uninterrupted operation by private or 
public institutions. In these cases, a possible interruption may create serious problems that may 
jeopardize the normal functioning of certain services or even of a country. The National Infra-
structure Protection Plan from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had 16 sectors 
and key assets considered as critical infrastructure including: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; 
Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; 
Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public 
Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation Sys-
tems; Water and Wastewater Systems [28]. In all these services, certain measures need to be 
applied in case of a disruptive event considering that some of these infrastructures are interde-
pendent.  
The World Trade Center (WTC) disaster can be used as an example about different inter-
dependencies. According to [29] “The building collapses triggered water-main breaks that 
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flooded rail tunnels, a commuter station, and the vault containing all of the cables for one of the 
largest telecommunication nodes in the world. These included the Security Industry Data Network 
and the Security Industry Automation Corporation circuits used to execute and confirm block 
trades on the stock exchange. Before trading resumed on the New York Stock Exchange on Mon-
day, September 17, 2001, the telecommunications network had to be reconfigured.” 
So, [29] clearly states that it is helpful to unify concepts in a “smaller number of sectors 
based on common features”. Therefore, the concept of a “lifeline system” (or simply lifelines) 
emerges. It was developed to evaluate the performance of large, geographically distributed net-
works during earthquakes, hurricanes, and other hazardous natural events and are grouped into 
six principal systems: electric power, gas, and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, 
waste disposal, and water supply. These lifeline systems all influence each other, and daily infra-
structures utilized by a large population have become more complex and interdependent, there-
fore, a failure in one of these can create chain failures. Thinking about critical infrastructure 
through the subset of lifelines may help to clarify features that are common to essential support 
systems.  
Electric power networks, for example, provide energy for pumping stations, storage fa-
cilities, and equipment control for transmission and distribution systems for oil and natural gas. 
Oil provides fuel and lubricants for generators, and natural gas provides energy for generating 
stations, compressors, and storage, all of which are necessary for the operation of electric power 
networks. The continued operation of the telecommunications network, for example, is of major 
importance to the energy industry in order to allow continuous contact between various substa-
tions or infrastructures. Companies that provide services to other companies or entities, such as 
companies that store information in Data Centers, may also need a continuous power supply with 
the least possible power failures per year. For example, according to [30], the digital users are a 
contributor to the complexity of the Power Grid. He adds “Some experts indicate that reliability 
will need to go from 99.9% (roughly 8 hours of power loss per year) to 99.99999999% reliability 
(32 seconds of power loss per year).” 
Coordinating all the systems, infrastructures and personnel, according to [30], may take 
some time and while some coordination occurs under computer control, a lot of it is still based on 
telephone calls between system operators at the utility control centers (especially during emer-
gencies). This work proposes the use of agents, as previously mentioned, since this technology 
can make some decisions as soon as it detects any changes that may require it. Another document, 
[31], refers to the importance of developing a deeper understanding of the multiple interdepend-
encies and their implications that are able to cover up multiple disciplines ranging from engineer-
ing and complexity science to sociology, policy research and political science. Modeling and 
simulation will be even more important in the development of this science. 
It is, therefore, very important to promote behaviors and actions aimed at fomenting 
awareness, which requires public concern that can be informed through public education (via 
newspapers and television, for example) and through risk communication (which can be done by 
local professional societies). 
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2.5. Data Center 
A Data Center is any facility that houses computer systems and other components, such as 
telecommunications and storage systems. Nowadays, this type of infrastructures has the capacity 
to provide services, not only to the regular consumer but also to large enterprises, financial insti-
tutions, government agencies that want fast Internet connectivity and non-stop operation to deploy 
systems and to establish a presence on the Internet providing some type of service to a large 
population, or that may want to store their data in a safe and secure network. 
This type of installations are increasing, as well as the number of threats [32], and the 
operations made in this type of installations could be crucial for business continuity. A data center 
can be either a small server existing in a personal home or a building dedicated just for that pur-
pose. Those buildings can be an industrial-scale operation, using as much electricity as a small 
town, and have to be equipped with all sorts of systems and equipment that can ensure the proper 
functioning of the entire Information Technologies (IT) systems. It requires equipment that has 
the ability to supply power continuously and with minimal fluctuations (such as a Uninterruptible 
Power Supply (UPS), Battery Banks and Emergency groups), redundant systems or backup com-
ponents to ensure that services remain operational (if a fault occurs) and cooling equipment (like 
air conditioning systems) that has the ability to maintain a controlled environment as servers and 
other computing components can generate a lot of heat and various security devices [33]. 
To assure the quality of the services provided, this type of infrastructure needs to obey to 
some standards and characteristics and organizations like the Uptime Institute define, who eval-
uate and certify those installations. They currently define four tiers which “describes the site-
level infrastructure topology required to sustain data center operations” [34]. The following are 
a brief summary of each of the Tiers: 
• Tier I: Basic Capacity: There is a need to shut down the entire site to perform 
maintenance or repair operations. Capacity and distribution failures will impact the 
site. 
• Tier II: Redundant Capacity Components: There is still a need to shut down the 
entire site extension to perform maintenance. Capacity failures can impact the site. 
Distribution failures will impact the site. 
• Tier III: Concurrently Maintainable: Any capacity component and distribution path 
within a site can be removed in a manner designed to perform maintenance or re-
placement without impacting operations. The site will still be exposed to equip-
ment failure or operator error. 
• Tier IV: Fault Tolerant: An individual equipment failure or distribution path inter-
ruption will have no impact on operations. A fault tolerant site is also Concurrently 
Maintainable. 
According to the aforementioned classifications, it can be said that a Tier III-rated data 
center is, therefore, a more complex infrastructure and requires more comprehensive behaviors 
and greater risk mitigation rigor than a Tier I. The installed infrastructure, the rigor and sophisti-
cation of the equipment and the management methodologies are established by the purposes of 
the data center. Its construction and location characteristics and its management and mode of 
operation also weigh in this assessment as these elements have various categories and components 
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with associated risks. Therefore, the identification and mitigation of their behaviors and risks are 
directly linked to the Tiers classification system. 
But as it is possible to comprehend, this type of infrastructures is not fail-proof. The Uptime 
Institute Survey about 2018 Outages Results clearly states that “Power was the most common 
cause of Level 4/5 outages from 2016 to 2018", as it can be seen in figure 9, and "IT and Network 
were close behind" (a disruption with of level 4/5 can be "Disruption of service and/or Opera-
tions" or a "Major and damaging disruption of services and/or operations") [35]. Though the pro-
portion of more severe interruptions has been decreasing, when analyzing data from 2016 to 2018, 
a failure of just a few seconds can impact a direct customer in a few hours considering that some 
of the information may have been compromised. This survey also states that: 
• “31% of respondents had an IT downtime incident or severe service degradation in 
the past year”; 
• “48% had an outage in their own site or service providers in the past three years”; 
• “80% report that their most recent outage was preventable”. 
 
Figure 9 - Causes of Major Outages over Three Years 1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Figure Taken from https://uptimeinstitute.com/webinars/webinar-data-center-outage-trends-
causes-and-updates 
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3. Development 
After addressing some important themes for the execution of this project, such as Resili-
ence, Resilience metrics, and Critical Infrastructure, this section will provide a detailed explana-
tion of the quantification model factors, the chosen metric, and the failure mode tables. All of the 
steps taken were made according to the pre-requisites needed for their implementation. All steps 
taken throughout this part of the dissertation will be shown and explained to bring clarity to this 
process.  
3.1. Initiation 
After completing the initial research phase, it was concluded that there were two very 
important points that when combined could serve as the starting point of this work:  
• Failure Modes, Effect Analysis (FMEA); 
• The Resilience Triangle. 
The Failure Modes, Effect Analysis method offers a very interesting idea of how to quantify 
and evaluate the impact of a failing component of an infrastructure. The idea of prioritizing certain 
events in detriment of less important ones is embodied deep within this method, and that makes 
it ideal to the pursued goal. 
The Resilience Triangle, such as the one presented in figure 10, could be considered the 
starting point that can justify the choices taken throughout this work. The first impressions taken 
by analyzing the Triangle were that this figure was easy to be applied to what was pretended, was 
able to create a relationship between the impact of the event (vertical axis) and the time which 
has lasted (horizontal axis) of a certain component or equipment, providing a clear visualization 
of the magnitude of the disorder and the negative impact on system performance, and was of easy 
understanding. Nonetheless, this system does not take into account the aging effects of the infra-
structure analyzed and in certain cases, this can influence the time of recovery of the infrastruc-
ture: while in certain cases the overall performance can come back to his normal state with a 
linear grow over time, in other cases that can happen in the instant right after the fixing of what 
3 
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needed to be fixed, giving an almost instant time of recovery, unlike the one presented in figure 
3, on Chapter 2.1. 
 
Figure 10 - A example of a Resilience Triangle 
In the previous figure, the following acronyms represent: 
• 𝑡0 = Time of incident; 
• 𝑡1 = Time to recovery; 
• 𝑄100 = Capacity of the system; 
• 𝑄𝑟 = Robustness of the system; 
3.2. Quantification Model 
The model to be developed must be easily understandable, leaving the least amount of 
questions, but at the same time must be complete so that future analysis of past events can be 
done safely and coherently. Therefore, there is a need to develop a model that can quantify an 
occurrence of what has happened. 
For this to happen it is necessary to create a model that can quantify the impact of an oc-
currence on a given infrastructure and another model that with this information can calculate the 
impact it has had on the resilience of the infrastructure. 
With this in mind, there were developed two models: one which can evaluate the impact 
that a failure has on the infrastructure and another that as the capability of calculating the final 
resilience impact that this event has on the infrastructure. These assumptions were thought off 
after some discussions about a deeper use of the Resilience Triangle. 
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3.2.1. The Incident and Failure Quantification Model of an Event 
The first step was to start developing the incident and fault quantification model. To this 
end, it is intended to create a system that characterizes a piece of equipment through certain pa-
rameters. 
So, this model is composed of 4 factors (Level, Significance, Redundancy and Type of 
Failure), which will be inserted by the analyst and that have different weights. These factors were 
chosen because combined they have the ability to characterize and differentiate a component re-
garding the infrastructure it is in, its technical characteristics and the importance that the company 
gives it. The combination of these factors may condition the level of the action itself after a dis-
turbing event. 
The weights must be calibrated in such a way that the result obtained is as close to reality 
as possible and so that in the event of the need to order all the events, they are ordered from the 
most important event to the one of the least importance. It is, therefore, necessary to describe the 
different variables and their subcategories for each of the factors to be introduced, so that all the 
components of the infrastructure to be analyzed can be defined quantitatively. This system should 
be applied to the Electrical system, the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning system 
(HVAC), and the Infrastructure Safety Systems. After defining all the factors from each compo-
nent, they will be multiplied, giving a final value of the failures' impact of that component in that 
infrastructure. That value will correspond to the Risk Priority Number that will be explained fur-
ther. This method is close to the one described by the FMEA process previously explained in 
chapter 2.3.2. 
The biggest difference between the classifications that will be proposed is that each of the 
factors to be presented has between 3 or 4 values (or weights) ranging from 0 to 1, instead of the 
10 assigned weights (in a range from 1 to 10) proposed in the FMEA system described in chapter 
2.3.2. Each of the proposed values will be explained in order to clarify any doubts that may come 
from the manager responsible for characterizing a new component that can be added to the infra-
structure, considerably simplifying the whole process of assigning values to each component. 
Since the value obtained by the proposed classification below will always be between 0 and 1, it 
can, therefore, be considered as a percentage value (comprised between 0 and 100%) allowing a 
more perceptible final value not only for the technician responsible for reporting an event but also 
for the manager responsible for all infrastructure. 
In the process of attributing quantitative values to each factor's variable, it was decided 
to recur to the Fibonacci Scale, a sequence of numbers used for estimating the relative size of user 
stories in points. This sequence tends to facilitate the user from the perspective of estimating, 
seeing and understanding differences in order to obtain more coherent values. 
To do it, it is of the utmost importance to utilize the Fibonacci’s Sequence. The beginning 
of the sequence is: 1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55… 
And to achieve these values the following calculations must be done: 
𝐹0 = 0      (7) 
𝐹1 = 1      (8) 
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𝐹𝑛 = 𝐹𝑛−1 + 𝐹𝑛−2            (9) 
So, after getting the first values of the scale and knowing the number of necessary values, 
the following sequence was generated to get the final proportions: 
𝐴𝑛 =
𝐹𝑛
∑ 𝐹𝑖
𝛼
𝑖=1
, 𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝛼]             (10) 
Where: 
• 𝛼 = the number of necessary values; 
• 𝐹𝑛 = the Fibonacci sequence values for each 𝑛 ∈ ℕ . 
Table 3 - The auxiliary values necessary to obtain the final weights 
 𝛼 = 3 𝛼 = 4 𝛼 = 5 
𝑨𝟏 0.25 0.1429 0.0833 
𝑨𝟐 0.25 0.1429 0.0833 
𝑨𝟑 0.5 0.2857 0.1667 
𝑨𝟒  0.4286 0.25 
𝑨𝟓   0.4167 
 
To conclude, to obtain the final weights, the following calculus must be done:   
𝑊1 = 1       (11) 
𝑊𝑛 = 𝑊𝑛−1 − 𝐴𝛼−𝑛+2, 𝑛 ∈ [2, 𝛼]           (12) 
This sequence originated the following values to be applied in the factors that are going 
to be presented below.  
Table 4 - The final weights, obtained with Fibonacci's sequence 
 𝛼 = 3 𝛼 = 4 𝛼 = 5 
𝑾𝟏 1 1 1 
𝑾𝟐 0.5 0.57 0.58 
𝑾𝟑 0.25 0.29 0.33 
𝑾𝟒  0.14 0.17 
𝑾𝟓   0.08 
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With the exception of Redundancy, where the values would not be consistent with the 
true impact of an event, these values were assigned to the factors. Possible changes that have been 
made and the calibration process of these values will be explained in a later chapter. 
3.2.1.1. Level 
The first value to be introduced is the Level. This value attempts to aggregate devices and 
components that are in a certain position of the installation in the same group. The model under-
study will have four levels with the following weights: A - 1st level; B - 2nd level; C - 3rd level; 
D - 4th level. 
 
Figure 11 – A simplified scheme of a tree of energy with different levels 
 
Figure 12 - An example of an arrangement of equipment through which the upstream downstream 
energy flow passes 
Figure 11 demonstrates that a piece of equipment that is located in level C will be down-
stream of the level A and B, therefore, the flow of energy needs to go first through these last 
levels. Figure 12, demonstrates an example of the components that are disposed in a power infra-
structure of a building, showing the flow energy from the transformer to the power plug. The first 
component is the Transformer and is classified as Level A, the second is the LVDB (level B), the 
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third is the UPS (level B), the fourth is the Infrastructure Transformer (IT) (level C) and the last 
one is the Distribution Board (level C).  
Table 3 will give a resume of the attributed values and the description of the levels will be 
as follows: 
A. The first level (weight 1), will refer to components that are more upstream of the instal-
lation. In the case of the electrical installation, the components in question are those that 
supply energy to the installation, such as Extension of energy input in the building, Gen-
erator Group, Transformers; etc. 
B. The second level (weight 0.57), refers to the components immediately following this first 
group: Low Voltage Distribution Board (LVDB); Uninterruptible Power System (UPS) 
etc. 
C. The third level (weight 0.29), refers to Distribution Board’s (DB), Isolation Transformers 
(IT), etc.; 
D. Finally, the fourth level (weight 0.14) refers to the components downstream of the instal-
lation, namely: racks, lighting, outlets, etc.; 
Table 5 - Weight and Degree of each Level 
1st value: Level - Corresponds to the positioning of the equipment in the installation 
(where A is closer to the power source and D is farthest) 
Parameters A B C D 
Weight of the Factor 1 0.57 0.29 0.14 
 
3.2.1.2. Significance 
Significance corresponds to the relevance of equipment previously defined by the company 
itself. The failure of certain equipment can jeopardize the continuity of its activity and it is im-
portant for the company that there is such a distinction between certain equipment to create a 
hierarchy of importance within a level so that it is possible to prioritize certain equipment to the 
detriment of others. The objective will be to create three levels with the following weights: 1 - 1st 
level; 2 - 2nd level; 3 - 3rd level. So, table 4 will give a resume of the attributed values and the 
description of the importance levels will be done as follows: 
1. The first level (weight 1) will refer to components that are of major importance to the 
company and in which its failure is considered an Emergency since the service has been 
affected in its entirety. The company must make every effort to ensure that this type of 
equipment remains operable and usable; 
2. The second level (weight 0.5) refers to equipment that is of great importance to the com-
pany and where its failure partially affects its activity. If they are not serviced quickly, 
they may jeopardize the normal functioning of the infrastructure or a part of it. 
3. The third level (weight 0.25) refers to equipment that does not affect the normal activity 
of the company. These can be postponed indefinitely, as they do not jeopardize the nor-
mal functioning and safety of the infrastructure but must be resolved as soon as possible. 
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Table 6 - Weight and Degree of each Significance Level 
2nd value: Significance - Corresponds to the importance of the equipment 
in the installation (where 1 is the most severe and 3 the least) 
Parameters 1 2 3 
Weight of the Factor 1 0.5 0.25 
 
3.2.1.3. Redundancy 
The value of Redundancy considers the existence or otherwise of infrastructures or emer-
gency systems that can maintain the normal operation of the infrastructure in case of need. Let 
us, therefore, consider the following 3 cases: No Redundancy (N); With Redundancy (N + 1); 
With Redundancy (2N), such that: 
• N. No Redundancy (weight 1) refers to equipment and infrastructures that do not have 
any type of distress and where their failure can render unusable the equipment or infra-
structure concerned and all those that are downstream of it. A fault in a piece of equip-
ment that does not have any type of Redundancy and can be considered critical since this 
is the only distribution path of a certain service or component; 
• N + 1. This type of Redundancy (weight 0.8) refers to equipment and infrastructures that 
have extra elements that can suppress an event or incident of equipment or component of 
the infrastructure. A fault in a piece of equipment will not be considered critical since 
there is more than one distribution path of a particular service or component, without 
prejudice to its normal operation; 
• 2N. This type of Redundancy (weight 0.7) refers to equipment and infrastructures that 
exist in duplicate without being a single point of failure. In the event of an incident, a site 
or other type of service provided by an IT equipment will not be affected since the instal-
lation is prepared so that any of its components can be detached from the installation 
without affecting any service. 
As it was previously done, the next table will give a resume of the attributed values. 
Table 7 - Weight and Degree of each Redundancy Level 
3rd value: Redundancy - Is there any Redundancy or Emergency? 
Parameters N N+1 2N 
Weight of the Factor 1 0.8 0.7 
 
3.2.1.3. Type of Failure 
This value is important to characterize the urgency of a given failure within a piece of 
equipment, depending on the affected component. To do this, 3 levels of failure will be catego-
rized as follows: 
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• Type 1 (weight 1) are faults that have left a piece of equipment or component inoper-
able and that may harm equipment and components downstream of it. The function 
desired by this equipment is not obtained, so the resolution of this problem must be 
urgent. 
• Type 2 (weight 0.5) are faults that have caused serious damage, or which may create 
short term problems in the affected equipment or equipment downstream. There is a 
deviation outside the acceptable operating limits of equipment and the resolution of 
this problem should not be delayed for long. 
• Type 3 (weight 0.25) are failures that did not affect equipment or components severely 
and that can be postponed since it does not compromise the normal functioning of this 
one and that they do not have an immediate and critical impact on its function. 
Table 8 - Weight and Degree of each Type of Failure Level 
4th Value: Type of Failure - Characterization of Importance and Urgency 
of a particular Failure 
Parameters 1 2 3 
Weight of the Factor 1 0.5 0.25 
 
3.2.2. Final Result (Risk Priority Number) 
The Final Result, or Risk Priority Number (RPN), corresponds to the factor of each of the 
components that will serve as the differentiation element to classify the incidents in order of rel-
evance. This number will emerge after a quantitative evaluation of all the factors previously con-
sidered and the main objective is to quantify all the events relative to their priority so that greater 
importance is given to the events with the highest RPN. To achieve this value, the used formula 
is: 
𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝐿 × 𝑆 × 𝑅 × 𝑇    (13) 
Where: 
• 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = Risk Priority Number; 
• 𝐿 = Level; 
• 𝑆 = Significance; 
• 𝑅 = Redundancy; 
• 𝑇 = Type of Failure. 
 These results will be ordered according to a scale of five priorities and their value may 
determine the company's time of action concerning the event in question. The scale description 
will be done as follows: 
• 1st - Emergency (weight between 0.58 and 1): This level will refer to events or inci-
dents in which a failure, or lack of functioning, is considered an Urgency and should 
be treated with the greatest speed (in a matter of hours), since the normal functioning 
of the services may be in immediate danger. Failure or interruption may jeopardize 
the health, people’ safety or damage to the building and may prevent the normal op-
eration of all, or part of the infrastructure, or failures and interruptions in equipment 
downstream of the fault; 
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• 2nd - High (weight from 0.33 to 0.58): The second level refers to events or incidents 
that are of great importance to the company and which, if not taken care of quickly, 
can endanger the normal functioning of the infrastructure or a part of it, and it is, 
therefore, necessary that this type of situation be resolved in a short time (from 1 to 3 
days); 
• 3rd - Medium (weight from 0.17 to 0.33): This level refers to events that are important 
and not to be neglected. These can be completed within a longer period (15 days) if it 
does not cause abnormal functioning of the entire infrastructure, or part, or that en-
dangers the safety of users; 
• 4th - Low (weight 0.08 to 0.17): Refers to Work Orders that do not endanger the Infra-
structure and the normal functioning of the building and that do not in any way com-
promise the safety of users. As a rule, this type of incident can be completed within a 
longer period (1 month), since the normal operation of the services will not be af-
fected; 
• 5th - Scheduled Maintenance (weight from 0 to 0.08): This level refers to events or 
incidents that can be delayed for a longer time (6 months) as they do not jeopardize 
normal operation and safety of infrastructure. 
Table 9 - Range of each level of the final result 
Colors: Gravity Level 
Parameters 5 4 3 2 1 
Range of the Level 0% - 8% 8% - 17% 17% - 33% 33% - 58% 58% - 100% 
Evaluation Scheduled Low Medium High Emergency 
 
3.2.3. The Resilience Quantification metric chosen (Ayyub, 2015) 
The metric that was chosen to develop this model was presented in the article "Practical 
Resilience Metrics for Planning, Design and Decision Making" [26] and that was already ana-
lyzed in the chapter 2.2.5. It was decided to apply this metric as it was easy to understand not only 
at a development stage by an analyst or the developer but also at a future stage when anyone who 
has to use it in the business world and has never seen it can adapt to it and has the ability to 
improve it. It aims to achieve a final resilience value after an incident and takes into account the 
disruptive events occurred in the past, the length of time between the start of the incident and the 
final recovery time, the loss of resilience after a failure and other variables that will be further 
deepened forward. 
3.2.3.1. Proposed Metrics and Variables 
The formulas that will be used to obtain the final Resilience where already presented.  How-
ever, it is important to realize that a minor change has been made to one of the formulas (5), which 
is taken into account in the article where it is located, and it is also important to describe how all 
the variables and values to be used in these formulas were calculated. Nonetheless the formulas 
and variables are as follows: 
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𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑅𝑓) =
(𝑡𝑟−𝑡𝑖)(𝑄100−𝑄𝑟)
𝑄100𝑡
    (14) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑅𝑒) = 1 − exp [−𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅)] + exp[−𝜆𝑡]          (15) 
Where: 
• 𝜆 = The rate of a Poisson Process. A Poisson Process is a model for a series of discrete 
events where the average time between events is known but the exact timing of the 
events is random. The arrival of an event is independent of the event before, so, the 
waiting time between events is memoryless [36]. This point will be developed further;  
• 𝑡 = Planning Horizon; 
• 𝑝 = Probability of a failure; 
• 𝑅𝑓 = Resilience per Failure; 
• 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅ = Non-Resilience per Failure 
• 𝑡𝑟 = Time to recovery; 
• 𝑡𝑖 = Time of incident; 
• 𝑄100 = Capacity of the system; 
• 𝑄𝑟 = Robustness of the system; 
The following figure locates in a resilience triangle model some of the variables previ-
ously described. 
 
Figure 13 - Fundamental Resilience Case of Linear Recovery [26]  
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3.2.3.2. Variables and their characteristics 
It is not only important to know what do the variables mean but it is also important to 
understand the way they were applied. Therefore, this section is going to be used to understand 
and explain how these values were obtained, besides the variable 𝜆, which are going to be ana-
lyzed further. 
• 𝑡 - Planning Horizon; 
The planning horizon considered in the resilience calculation was 1 year. The infrastructure 
in question has a useful life of approximately 40 years but to achieve a more tangible and not so 
infamous results, it was decided to consider the 1-year time horizon to be able to calculate a lost 
resilience value annually. Therefore, the value of 𝑡 throughout the calculations will always be 1. 
However, it should be noted that other time periods could be considered. 
• 𝑝 - Probability of a failure; 
This variable refers to the probability of a failure to happen. Considered that in the previous 
year 20 accidents happened, according to internal information, it makes sense to consider that the 
value of 𝑝 is 1 since a disturbance is likely to occur in the future. However, if in the future that is 
not true, it is advised to recalculate that variable to obtain a more appropriate value given the 
current situation. 
• 𝑅𝑓 - Resilience per Failure; 
Resilience per Failure refers to the area of the Resilience Triangle that was previously cal-
culated. This area can be represented as the loss of functionality of the system. As it was men-
tioned before, the calculus of this value was slightly changed because while the previous case 
considers a linear recovery, it should be considered that when facing a step recovery, after the 
necessary repairs, the overall performance of the infrastructure returns to its previous value if 
aging effects are not taken into account by creating an area similar to the rectangle, such as the 
one presented in figure 14, rather than a triangle. So, in the denominator of formula (14), the value 
2 must be removed, leaving it equal to 𝑄100𝑡.  
 
Figure 14 - A example of a Resilience Rectangle 
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• 𝑡𝑟 , 𝑡𝑖  - Time to recovery and Time of Incident; 
These variables directly depend on the historical data of incidents that have occurred in this 
infrastructure. However, soon it was found that the historical data only contained the information 
regarding the day in which the event has occurred. Therefore, it will be considered that these 
values are referred to in days and to simplify the calculus and the insertion of data from the ana-
lyst, it will only be considered the difference between the time of the incident and the time to 
recover. 
• 𝑄100 = Capacity of the system; 
This value refers to the initial capacity of the infrastructure, at which it can be assumed to 
be "as good as new", at 100%. To do so, let's assume that the value of this variable is 1. 
• 𝑄𝑟 = Robustness of the system; 
The Robustness of the system refers to the value that was previously calculated by the 
multiplication of the 4 factors of each component, or equipment, in chapter 3.2.1. 
3.3. Failure Mode Tables 
The creation of Failure Mode Tables arises from the need to give maintenance technicians 
and managers the ability to characterize, with a brief description, a maintenance event, fault or 
operation in a more concrete way so that in the future there will be the ability to analyze the entire 
historical data of a specific equipment or even an infrastructure. However, this work depends on 
a lot of research and fieldwork and according to [37] “ a clear understanding of the equipment’s 
technical characteristics, its operating and environmental conditions, its potential failures and 
its maintenance activities” to understand what are the possible faults in a piece of equipment 
since many faults and malfunctions, even being specific to equipment, may not happen since they 
are not in an environment that provides this specific occurrence. A uniform definition of failure 
and a method of classifying failures are essential when data from different sources (plants and 
operators) need to be combined in a common reliability and maintenance database. A common 
report for all equipment classes shall be used for reporting failure data.  
Therefore, this work aims to: 
• Create a table as straightforward as possible to leave out any doubts when reporting 
an event, but not too generic so that it will become too ambiguous in a future analysis; 
• All components contained within must be equipment that must be properly classified 
in the Quantification Model; 
• Every failure can have a small descriptive line with details about that failure.  
• An equipment may have several failures and those failure may be common to various 
equipment. Common cause failures can be also considered common mode failures. 
Common mode failures can have different causes and common mode failures can also 
be common cause failures; 
• All equipment and faults must have unique codes. A short range of codes may be too 
general to be useful. A long range of codes may give a more precise description but 
will slow the input process and may not be used fully by the data acquirer.  
• It is also recommended that free text be included to provide supplementary infor-
mation. A free-text field with additional information is also useful for quality control 
of data so that some detailed information may not be lost. 
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In recent times, greater emphasis has been placed on cost-effective design and maintenance 
for new and existing installations. Therefore, failure data, failure and maintenance mechanisms 
that are in any way related to industrial facilities have become very important and sharing this 
information between multiple companies or between different sectors of the same company can 
contribute to greater capacity of prevention or fault detection. So, it is important to have Reliabil-
ity and Maintenance (RM) data, especially from critical equipment, in order to estimate the risk 
of hazards to people and the environment or to analyze system performance.  
To better analyze and help in the decision-making moments it can be necessary to have 
data covering several years of operation in order to obtain a confident analysis. At the same time, 
it is essential that the causes of failures are clearly stated in order to prioritize and implement 
corrective actions that bring improvements, promoting bigger profits and bringing security in an 
enterprise. 
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4.  Implementation 
After understanding the factors of the incident's quantification model and understanding 
the chosen metric, it is necessary to implement it and adapt it to the infrastructure considering its 
characteristics. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the characteristics of the infrastructure, its 
past, and the importance of this infrastructure to the company. All the steps taken throughout the 
implementation of the Quantification Model will be presented and explained to bring clarity to 
this process. It will also test whether the sample of past events follows a Poisson process. This 
step is of utmost importance for this work. If it is not guaranteed that this is a Poisson process, it 
will not be possible to apply the chosen metric.  
4.1. General characterization of the Building and its Power Installation 
This work is going to be developed in a building that stores a Data Center. This building 
is currently of the utmost importance to the company responsible for it. It provides data storage 
and other internet services necessary not only to the company responsible for the building but 
also to third parties. Currently, there is a team responsible for the maintenance and management 
of the building, who makes all the decisions when an event happens or if a deeper intervention is 
required. There is another permanent surveillance team responsible for acting immediately if nec-
essary. The company in question, having external customers, who would use this as Data Center 
to store information or to use other provided services, found that there was a need to improve both 
the power and HVAC supply conditions in order to maintain the correct functioning of all the 
systems. In the recent past, during a corrective maintenance action on UPS units, a malfunction 
has occurred that has jeopardized the exploitation of services by external customers. Differential 
faults have been detected in some UPS circuit breakers, and the sensitivities of said differential 
protection relays need to be adjusted. This all occurred after a maintenance action. As a result, 
redundancy has been lost in the Distribution Board fed through the power extension, increasing 
the risk of failures of a customer's mono powered circuits. 
The Building is fed through the national power Grid in Medium Voltage (15 kV). It has 
three 1250 kVA transformers, which power their LVDB’s. They all have a “Rescued Bus Bar” 
4 
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and a “Normal Bus Bar”. All essential services are powered from the “Rescued Bus Bar”, being 
that the 3 existing UPS banks (600 kVA each) assure the uninterruptible power supplies to the 
data centers. All the existing services in the data center are bi fed (each Rack always receives 
power from two of the three existing Power Branch). The building also has three Emergency 
groups (one with 1000 kVA and 2 with 1250 kVA), to safeguard the rescued feeds. Nonetheless, 
as the building has been expanding over its lifetime, its power feeding characteristics give added 
complexity not only to the maintenance teams but also to possible future work and extensions.  
So, through some documentation, it was possible to describe the following points: 
• The building was built (and/or acquired for the holding company from a competing 
company) around 2001; 
• In 2010 the building suffered an upgrade with the installation of an Emergency Group 
to support the existing one, and two emergency groups are now included in the com-
plex, so that the second will be used as the safety to first one; 
• In 2011, a new work was developed in order to accommodate the first Racks of a third-
party company. A new Power and HVAC project was developed in order to make the 
previous installations into a 2N topology; 
• In 2012, the new Auxiliary Services made major efforts to enhance 2N redundancy 
and add capacity to the existing data center, endowing it with a new Emergency 
Group, and new UPS, turning the entire data center into 2N to give the infrastructure 
the ability to provide uninterrupted power with the appropriate emergency relief in-
frastructures and critical HVAC infrastructures. 
4.2.  𝝀, The rate of a Poisson Process 
This point comes as a deepen study of the metric proposed in chapter 3.2.3. Since obtain-
ing the value of this variable is one of the most important points of the implementation process. 
This step is essential because if a Poisson process is not confirmed, it is not possible to apply this 
metric. It was, therefore, necessary to carry out a more in-depth study to see if this was the case 
and if it was possible to proceed accordingly. 
To be able to verify that it is in fact a Poisson Process two rules must be obeyed: 
• 1st step: The inverse of the standard deviation must be very close to the inverse of the 
mean of the data sample, as referred by [38]; 
𝝀 ≈  
1
𝜎
 ≈  
1
𝜇
      (16) 
• 2nd step: The skewness of the sample must be very close to 2, as the reference [39] 
indicates. 
So, the first step was to define the sample of events. Taking into account that reference 
[26] states "Poisson process of stressors with an annual rate (𝝀)”(as shown in the next figure) 
and “the planning horizon related to the stressor rate as 𝑡 = 1 𝝀⁄ ", the first step was to determine 
if there was a certain degree of agreement between the sample of events. 
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Figure 15 - Poisson process of a stressor with varied intensity. Based on a figure present in Ayyub, 
2015.  [26] 
Therefore, all the events and the dates on which they occurred were gathered. Then, all 
events were sorted by occurrence date and the ∆𝑡 value for the number of days between each 
occurrence was calculated. This ∆𝑡 value will serve as the sample of events. In the next table, the 
variation between events and the dates in which they occurred are going to be displayed. The ∆𝑡 
values presented are in days. 
Table 10 - Table with the events and the dates in which they occurred 
Events Date of Occurrence ΔT between Events 
1 16/11/2017 214 
2 18/06/2018 4 
3 22/06/2018 1 
4 23/06/2018 3 
5 26/06/2018 1 
6 27/06/2018 15 
7 12/07/2018 12 
8 24/07/2018 12 
9 05/08/2018 30 
10 04/09/2018 2 
11 06/09/2018 41 
12 17/10/2018 13 
13 30/10/2018 3 
14 02/11/2018 38 
15 10/12/2018 1 
16 11/12/2018 6 
17 17/12/2018 18 
18 04/01/2019 5 
19 09/01/2019 12 
20 21/01/2019 57 
21 19/03/2019 0 
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One of the values that quickly stood out was the fact that the first ∆t value was noncom-
pliant with the other ∆t’s. Still, the standard deviation and the mean values were calculated in 
order to check if the first step previously noted was valid. Unfortunately, that didn't happen, and 
the differences were so big that it made sense to check if there was some problem with the sample.  
Therefore, the percentiles of normal distribution were calculated to find out if it made 
any sense to include that event in the data sample. Considering the fact that the value 214 is way 
beyond the 9995th percentile, it makes sense to exclude this event from the sample, as shown in 
the table below. 
Table 11 - Percentiles from the sample of events 
Percentile 
0,75 18 
0,8 30 
0,9 41 
0,95 57 
0,99 182.6 
0,995 198.3 
0,9995 212.43 
0,99999 213.9686 
0,999999 213.9969 
0,9999999 213.9997 
So, after removing the first event of the sample, new values of standard deviation and 
mean were calculated, and the results were much more adjusted to what it was pretended. And 
considering that the mean and standard deviation were approximately 0.069 and 0.064, respec-
tively, as table 10 shows, it was assumed that they were very close and a delta value of 0.07 was 
taken as a good fit for the intended value. 
Table 12 - Final values of Mean and Standard Deviation 
Mean 14.42105 
Standard Deviation 15.51677 
λ (Mean) 0.069343 
λ (Standard Deviation) 0.064446 
After ensuring that the sample was already within the intended parameters, the next step 
was to calculate the delta's skewness of the events. To do it, the Excel function SKEW that obeys 
the following formula was used: 
𝑛 ∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
3𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)𝑠3
              (17) 
Where, according to [40]: 
• 𝑛 = The number of samples in the data set; 
• 𝑥𝑖 = Is a random variable of a data set; 
• ?̅? = The mean of the data set; 
• 𝑠 = The standard deviation of the data set; 
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Skewness is a measure of symmetry of a determined data set or sample that may imply that 
the mean, the median, and the mode are not equal to each other. When these values are not the 
same, it is likely that some level of skewness is present in the analyzed data set. 
 
Figure 16 - Example of a normal distribution where the mean, the mode and the median are equal 2 
While the previous image shows a normal distribution in which the mean, the median, and 
the mode are equal, therefore creating a symmetric graph, a distribution that has a determined 
skewness may present a graph that may have a long tail pointing to the left (negative skew) or a 
long tail pointing to the right (positive skew).  
 
Figure 17 - Example of a data Sample that is positively skewed 3 
The value of the skewness is 1.549617 which means that the data sample is positively 
skewed. That shows that there are a bigger amount of smaller values than larger and that the mean 
is bigger than the median and the median is bigger than the mode, as table 13 shows, confirming 
what is being displayed in a previous image (Figure 17).[41] 
Table 13 - Table with the calculated values of the mean, median and mode 
Mean 14.42105 
Median 12 
Mode 1 
 
2 Image taken from: https://excel2007master.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/norm_dist.png 
3 Image taken from: https://excel2007master.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/positive.png 
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The value of the skewness may indicate that this process is not exactly a Poisson 
Process and that it’s a bit of a “forced step” which may indicate that the data set may be 
not exactly exponential. Also, having a discrete sample instead of a continuous one may 
not help to achieve what is needed.  
 
Figure 18 - Histogram of the Data Set 
In the previous histogram, the X-axis contains the data divided into multiple groups with 
the same range and the Y-axis has the number of variables contained in a range (the number of 
values contained between 1 and 5, 6 and 10 etc.).The previous histogram also shows that the range 
of values is very dispersed. This can be caused by reporting failures made in the past.  
A bigger number of events, therefore a bigger data sample, would probably contribute to a 
better value of skewness and would probably originate a graph more similar to the one present in 
figure 14. However, these values do not negate the possibility of not being in front of a Poisson 
Process, therefore, it was necessary to make a final test to reach a safer conclusion. So, the next 
step was to make a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test. 
According to [42], “The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test is a test of goodness of fit”, 
which means that it is related with the degree of agreement between the distribution of a set of 
sample values (observed scores) and some specified theoretical distribution. It determines 
whether the scores in a sample can reasonably be presumed to derive from a population having a 
theoretical distribution. 
Briefly, the test involves specifying the cumulative frequency distribution which would 
occur under the theoretical distribution and comparing that with the observed cumulative fre-
quency distribution. The theoretical distribution represents what would be expected under 𝐻0 
(The null hypothesis). In this case:  
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• 𝐻0 =  The data set follows an exponential distribution with rate 𝝀 = 𝟎, 𝟎𝟕; 
• 𝐻1 = The data set does not follow an exponential distribution. 
 The point at which these two distributions, theoretical and observed, show the greatest 
divergence is determined. Reference to the sampling distribution indicates whether such a large 
divergence is likely on the basis of chance, so, the sampling distribution indicates whether diver-
gence of the observed magnitude would probably occur if the observations were really a random 
sample from the theoretical distribution. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test treats individual observations separately, thus 
not losing any information throughout the combining of categories. When samples are small, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is applicable and may be more powerful than some of its alternatives.  
This test focuses on the largest of the deviations between 𝐹0(𝑥) − 𝑆𝑁(𝑥), referring it as the 
maximum deviation. To reach this value, it is necessary to sort the sample values in ascending 
order (from the lowest value to the highest). And to reach the value of maximum deviation, the 
necessary formula is: 
𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥|𝐹0(𝑥) − 𝑆𝑁(𝑥)|     (18) 
Where: 
• 𝐷 = Maximum Deviation; 
• 𝐹0(𝑥) = It is a completely specified cumulative distribution function. That is, for any 
value of X, the value of 𝐹0(𝑥) is the proportion of cases expected to have scores equal 
to or less than X. To reach to the expected value, the next formula will be used: 
 
𝐹0(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒
(−𝜆𝑋𝑥)     (19) 
 
This is a cumulative distribution function of an exponential distribution, where: 
o 𝜆 = The delta value previously calculated, equal to 0,07, as stated in the null 
hypothesis. 
o 𝑋𝑥 = The corresponding value of the data sample. 
• 𝑆𝑁(𝑥) = It is the observed cumulative frequency distribution of a random sample of 
N observations. The formula is: 
𝑆𝑁(𝑥) =
𝑁𝑥
𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥
     (20) 
Where: 
o 𝑁𝑥 = is the number of observations equal to or less than X; 
o 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 = The number of observations. 
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Table 14 - Calculated values from the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test 
𝑁𝑥 𝑋𝑥 𝑆𝑁(𝑥) 𝐹𝑁(𝑥) |𝐹𝑁(𝑥) − 𝑆𝑁−1(𝑥)| |𝐹𝑁(𝑥) − 𝑆𝑁(𝑥)| 
1 1 0.01754386 0.06760618 0.06760618 0.050062 
2 1 0.035087719 0.06760618 0.05006232 0.032518 
3 1 0.052631579 0.06760618 0.032518461 0.014975 
4 2 0.070175439 0.130641765 0.078010186 0.060466 
5 3 0.087719298 0.189415754 0.119240315 0.101696 
6 3 0.105263158 0.189415754 0.101696456 0.084153 
7 4 0.122807018 0.244216259 0.138953101 0.121409 
8 5 0.140350877 0.29531191 0.172504893 0.154961 
9 6 0.157894737 0.34295318 0.202602303 0.185058 
10 12 0.175438596 0.568289477 0.41039474 0.392851 
11 12 0.192982456 0.568289477 0.39285088 0.375307 
12 12 0.210526316 0.568289477 0.37530702 0.357763 
13 13 0.228070175 0.597475776 0.38694946 0.369406 
14 15 0.245614035 0.650062251 0.421992075 0.404448 
15 18 0.263157895 0.716345974 0.470731938 0.453188 
16 30 0.280701754 0.877543572 0.614385677 0.596842 
17 38 0.298245614 0.930051778 0.649350024 0.631806 
18 41 0.315789474 0.943301073 0.645055459 0.627512 
19 57 0.333333333 0.981500286 0.665710812 0.648167 
 
After obtaining all the values for the maximum deviation, D, it is concluded that the max-
imum value calculated is 0,665710812. Next, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov table will be created to find 
out whether or not to reject the Data Sample. 
So, for 𝑁 = 19 and with an 𝛼 = 0.01 a critical value of 0,36117 is obtained, as shown in 
table 15, and considering that the used 𝜆 is 0,07 (a smaller 𝛼 guarantees a smaller critical value 
for the sample N), it is possible to conclude that the data sample passes the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
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test, validating the value of 𝜆. Since the test has not rejected the hypothesis of being an exponential 
distribution, with the λ presented above, and  being a Poisson process, it is, therefore, possible to 
apply this metric in this project. 
Table 15 - Critical Value of the maximum absolute difference between sample Fn(x) and population 
F(x) [43] 
 
4.3. Characterization of each component 
After concluding that this metric would be applicable, it was necessary to start to identify 
which were the components that needed to be classified in order to evaluate their impact in the 
main infrastructure. To do that, it was necessary to resort to the company's internal information 
system that contained all existing components in all of the companies’ infrastructures. However, 
only components existing in this building are going to be classified in order to obtain a final Risk 
Priority Number. 
At the time the characterization process had started, it was clear that some components had 
variables, which were of almost automatic classification, such as the Level and Redundancy con-
sidering that their position in the infrastructure and their redundancies were known. However, the 
Importance and the Type of Failure factors were not straightforward. So, it was important to find 
a way of comparing every single result of every component in order to get to an RPN that was 
compliant with to the intended purpose. The found solution was to create a fully automatic Excel 
file that had the ability to change the values of the variable weights and their degrees of im-
portance, as demonstrated in chapter 3.2.1., so that a small adjustment applies to all modifications, 
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making it easier for those analyzing and comparing the results to have the possibility of later 
adjusting these values if needed.  
It was also necessary to characterize the components in types of equipment that were con-
sidered essential and that could easily distinguish every component in a category that is consid-
ered essential to the company. Therefore, a component was characterized in one of four types of 
equipment:  
• Energy: This category refers to all the essential components that ensure a proper and 
a continuous flow of energy in the building, and some of its emergencies, to ensure 
that there are no faults. For example, the Generator, Power Transformer, UPS and 
LVDB. 
• HVAC: This category refers to all the components that assure the correct climatization 
of the building including fans and heaters, chillers, water deposits, fans and boilers 
• Emergency: This category refers to essential components and systems of protection to 
the building, including the fire detection system, fire extinguishers, alarming systems, 
and distribution boards only dedicated to this type of systems. 
• Others: This category refers to components or areas that were important to classify but 
were not fit to enter in one of the aforementioned categories. 
So, after getting the list of every component and categorizing it with the previously de-
scribed types of equipment, the next step was to ordinate every component in a list which would 
demonstrate every component and their evaluation in order to compare them. By doing this, it is 
possible to compare every component and evaluate if the obtained RPN value is consistent with 
what it is intended to achieve. All the classifications attributed to every component will be done 
according to the described in chapter 3.2.1. 
Table 16 - Table with the attributed values of each variable 
Data Center 
Type of 
Equipment 
Equipment Failure Mode Level Significance Redundancy 
Energy Disconnector Disconnector A 1 N 
Energy Generator Generator A 1 2N 
Energy Transformer Transformer A 1 2N 
Energy LVDB LVDB B 1 2N 
Energy UPS UPS B 1 2N 
Energy Rectifier Rectifier B 1 2N 
Energy UPS's DB Distribution Boards B 1 2N 
Energy DB Distribution Boards B 1 2N 
Energy 
Diesel Storage 
Tanks 
Storage Tanks B 2 N 
Energy Battery Cabinets Battery Cabinets B 2 2N 
Energy 
Isolation Trans-
former 
Transformer C 1 N 
Energy Power Plugs Power Plugs D 3 N 
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Table 17 - The Resulting RPN from each component 
Data Center Type of Failure: 1 
Type of 
Equipment 
Equipment RPN - Type 1 IGS - Type 1 
Priority - 
Type 1 
Energy Disconnector 70.00% 30.00% 1 
Energy Generator 70.00% 30.00% 1 
Energy Transformer 70.00% 30.00% 1 
Energy LVDB 39.90% 60.10% 2 
Energy UPS 39.90% 60.10% 2 
Energy Rectifier 39.90% 60.10% 2 
Energy UPS's DB 39.90% 60.10% 2 
Energy DB 29.00% 71.00% 3 
Energy Diesel Storage Tanks 28.50% 71.50% 3 
Energy Battery Cabinets 28.50% 71.50% 3 
Energy Isolation Transformer 29.00% 71.00% 3 
Energy Power Plugs 3.50% 96.50% 5 
 
Tables 16 and 17 show what is intended in this part of the paper, to have a list of all 
characterized equipment and their respective RPNs in order to find possible inconsistencies. 
These tables also demonstrate that a component of the infrastructure from a lower Level can be 
more important than a component from a higher one, with the examples of the Isolation Trans-
former and the Battery Cabinets: the Isolation Transformer is classified as C in the level factor 
and has a higher RPN than the Battery Cabinets (classified as B in that category), meaning that it 
is possible to have a lower level on one of the 4 factors and a higher RPN. It is important to state 
that all the components categorized in that list belong to the same "Type of Equipment" and the 
same Failure Mode can be common to various equipment. 
It is also important to mention the relevance that the Infrastructure’s General State (IGS) 
has for this process. This value is essential to calculate the loss of resilience with the metric de-
scribed in chapter 3.2.3.1., corresponding to the variable 𝑄𝑟 (Robustness of the system). With this 
value, it is possible to have a clearer view of the importance of the impacted component on the 
infrastructure and the company. To reach this value, one must simply subtract the RPN value 
from 100%, thus obtaining the supposed loss of robustness caused by the loss of this equipment 
in the analyzed infrastructure: 
1 − 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝐼𝐺𝑆                               (21) 
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Figure 19 - The Infrastructure's General State after a type 1 failure of the Generator 
4.3.1. Type of Failure 
It was also relevant to analyze the impact of the Type of Failure’s factor to the RPN. It is 
crucial to understand if this factor has the ability to distinctly change the RPN value in order to 
prioritize the urgency of a given failure, depending on the affected component. For example, 
Table 16 clearly shows that a Type 3 failure in a Diesel Storage Tank becomes less important 
than a Type 1 failure in a UPS. 
This type of classification is what is intended to achieve, since in this way it is possible to 
act more accordingly to the real impact of the event, or a set of them, and therefore allowing the 
technicians to make a more appropriate decision. Also, the obtained result, for the purposes of 
statistical analysis, becomes more favorable as the impact on the resilience of a Type 1 event is 
considerably more destructive than a Type 2 event. 
Table 18 - The impact of the Type of Failure factor in the RPN 
Data Center Type of Failure: 1 Type of Failure: 2 Type of Failure: 3 
Equipment 
IGS - 
Type 1 
Priority - 
Type 1 
IGS - 
Type 2 
Priority - 
Type 2 
IGS - 
Type 3 
Priority - 
Type 3 
Disconnector 30.00% 1 65.00% 2 82.50% 3 
Generator 30.00% 1 65.00% 2 82.50% 3 
Transformer 30.00% 1 65.00% 2 82.50% 3 
LVDB 60.10% 2 80.05% 3 90.03% 4 
UPS 60.10% 2 80.05% 3 90.03% 4 
Rectifier 60.10% 2 80.05% 3 90.03% 4 
UPS's DB 60.10% 2 80.05% 3 90.03% 4 
DB 71.00% 3 85.50% 4 92.75% 5 
Diesel Storage Tanks 71.50% 3 85.75% 4 92.88% 5 
Battery Cabinets 71.50% 3 85.75% 4 92.88% 5 
Isolation Transformer 71.00% 3 85.50% 4 92.75% 5 
Power Plugs 96.50% 5 98.25% 5 99.13% 5 
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4.3.2. Calibration 
As a way to manage the obtained results, it was necessary to proceed to some type of 
calibration, regardless of their accuracy and safeness. The first step was to comprehend if the 
multiplications of every factor of equipment made sense not only to the managers responsible for 
taking care of the facility but also to the technicians responsible for making the initial reports and 
applying the necessary resolutions mandated by the responsible managers. It was also necessary 
to understand if the obtained RPN defined a priority type appropriated to the type of equipment 
and the type of failure in question. 
Therefore, to try to understand what those results would be, an analysis was executed to all of 
those values by performing all possible multiplications in order to understand if the results ob-
tained created a wide enough range that was feasible to the expected finality. So, the multiplica-
tions were made by the following order, and some of those will be presented in tables 19 and 20. 
The remaining tables, and some auxiliary tables, will be shown in Annex A and the colors used 
in these tables match those described in chapter 3.2.2. and in table 9. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 (𝐿) × 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑆) = 𝐿𝑆𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠    (22) 
𝐿𝑆𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠  × 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 (𝑅) =  𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠    (23) 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠  × 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑅𝑃𝑁 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠  (24) 
After this calibration and to try to understand if the obtained results would be adequate 
to what was intended, RapidMiner software was used.  
RapidMiner is a Data Science software that provides an integrated environment for data 
preparation, machine learning, and predictive analytics that can support every step of the machine 
learning process. However, for it to be able to do this kind of analysis, it would require at least 
100 lines (where each line would correspond to 1 component) and the final list of components 
had only 63. Considering that the use of this software was inconclusive, it was therefore decided 
to discard its use.  
Table 19 - The Possible Results of Multiplying every value of the Level by every Significance value 
1st value: Level 
2nd value: Significance 
1 2 3 
1 0.5 0.25 
A 1 1 0.5 0.25 
B 0.57 0.57 0.285 0.1425 
C 0.29 0.29 0.145 0.0725 
D 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.035 
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Table 20 - The Possible Results of Multiplying every value of the Level, Significance, Redundancy 
and Type of Failure 
Level × Redundancy × 
Significance 
4º value: Types of Failure 
1 2 3 
1 0.5 0.25 
1 1 0.5 0.25 
0.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 
0.7 0.7 0.35 0.175 
0.57 0.57 0.285 0.1425 
0.5 0.5 0.25 0.125 
0.456 0.456 0.228 0.114 
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 
0.399 0.399 0.1995 0.09975 
0.35 0.35 0.175 0.0875 
0.29 0.29 0.145 0.0725 
0.285 0.285 0.1425 0.07125 
0.25 0.25 0.125 0.0625 
0.232 0.232 0.116 0.058 
0.228 0.228 0.114 0.057 
0.203 0.203 0.1015 0.05075 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.05 
0.1995 0.1995 0.09975 0.049875 
0.175 0.175 0.0875 0.04375 
0.145 0.145 0.0725 0.03625 
0.1425 0.1425 0.07125 0.035625 
0.14 0.14 0.07 0.035 
0.116 0.116 0.058 0.029 
0.114 0.114 0.057 0.0285 
0.112 0.112 0.056 0.028 
0.1015 0.1015 0.05075 0.025375 
0.09975 0.09975 0.049875 0.0249375 
0.098 0.098 0.049 0.0245 
0.0725 0.0725 0.03625 0.018125 
0.07 0.07 0.035 0.0175 
0.058 0.058 0.029 0.0145 
0.056 0.056 0.028 0.014 
0.05075 0.05075 0.025375 0.0126875 
0.049 0.049 0.0245 0.01225 
0.035 0.035 0.0175 0.00875 
0.028 0.028 0.014 0.007 
0.0245 0.0245 0.01225 0.006125 
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4.4. Failure Modes Table 
To create the Failure Modes Table, it was necessary to resort to documents and files that 
already had some information about the previously characterized components. Although some 
files were in no way related to the concerned infrastructure (documents [44] and [37] are related 
to petrochemical infrastructures and references [45] and [46] provided important information re-
lated to HVAC components), they contained essential information for the final table. Some infor-
mation was also requested to entities, responsible for supplying or providing maintenance to the 
component, to provide as much information as possible in order to build a tool that would be 
useful to the entire final system. 
After gathering all this information, it was necessary to create tables for each component 
previously analyzed, with the possible flaws and some of their details. It was easily realized that 
there were failures common to several components and other quite similar that could be com-
bined. 
After making all these combinations and completing the tables of each of the components, 
the final table was created. In order for it to be easily understood, it was intended to be as straight-
forward as possible so as not to raise doubts in the reporting process of an event, such as was 
previously described in chapter 3.3. Whenever possible, a short line with details of the fault was 
added, when it was thought that a short description could help clarify any doubts when classifying 
a possible failure. The final table was left with about 90 possible failure modes and all faults and 
equipment each having unique codes.  
So, in order to better understand the final table, it is important to leave some helpful notes, 
and thus, in order to better understand the created table. Therefore: 
• Nº of implications per failure – Number of components where this fault can be found; 
• Failure Mode code - A unique code for each failure mode; 
• Description - Brief description about the detected problem; 
• Details - Brief description with some details of the failure that can help in the report-
ing phase of the event and to clarify a possible doubt; 
• Equipment class code - A unique code for each of the equipment. 
This table is a continuous work and requires frequent update so that future events are more 
accurately characterized. By heavily recurring to this table, not only in an event occurred in the 
analyzed infrastructure but also on new infrastructures with other management teams, it is possi-
ble to improve it with better and safer information that could be obtained in the reporting pro-
cesses of those events. A complete table will be shown in Annex C. 
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Table 21 - Example of Failure Modes tables extracted from [37] 4 
ISO-14224-2016 
    Equipment class code CE CO EG 
Failure 
mode 
code 
Description Examples 
Combustion 
engines 
Compressors 
Electric 
Generators 
AIR 
Abnormal instru-
ment reading 
False alarm, faulty instrument indica-
tion 
X X X 
BRD Breakdown Serious damage (seizure, breakage) X X X 
ERO Erratic output Oscillating, hunting, instability X X  
ELF 
External leakage - 
fuel 
External leakage of supplied fuel/gas X   
ELP 
External leakage - 
process medium 
Oil, gas, condensate, water  X  
ELU 
External leakage – 
utility medium 
Lubricant, cooling water X X X 
FTS 
Failure to start on 
demand 
Doesn’t start on demand X X X 
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance X X  
INL Internal leakage 
Leakage internally of process or utility 
fluids 
X X  
LOO Low output Delivery/output below acceptance X X X 
NOI Noise Abnormal noise X X X 
OHE Overheating Machine parts, exhaust, cooling water X X X 
PDE 
Parameter devia-
tion 
Monitored parameter exceeding lim-
its, e.g. high/low alarm 
X X X 
PLU Plugged/ choked Flow restriction(s) X X  
SER 
Minor in-service 
problems 
Loose items, discoloration, dirt X X X 
STD 
Structural defi-
ciency 
Material damages (cracks, wear, frac-
ture, corrosion) 
X X X 
STP 
Failure to stop on 
demand 
Doesn’t stop on demand X X X 
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X 
UNK Unknown 
Too little information to define a fail-
ure mode 
X X X 
UST Spurious stop Unexpected shutdown X X X 
VIB Vibration Abnormal vibration X X X 
 
 
 
4 This table was extracted from [37], table B.6, page 187. This table is not complete and does not 
have all the components with their respective failure modes from the original table  
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Table 22 - Sample of the final Failure Modes Table 5 
  Energy  
Equipment Class Code GER COMP ELEM 
Nº of im-
plications 
per fail-
ure 
Failure 
mode 
code 
Description Details Generators Compressors 
Electrical 
Motors 
20 ALAR 
Alarm / Parameter 
Deviation 
Monitored parameters ex-
ceeding tolerances. Ex: De-
fault Alarm 
X X X 
14 DPF 
Downstream 
Power Failure 
Equipment Power Failure, 
Power Outlets failure etc. 
X   
1 FREG Failure to Regulate 
Valve Stuck / Control 
Valves Only 
   
16 FSD 
Failure to start on 
demand 
Does not start or open af-
ter order or failed to re-
spond to signal/activation 
X X X 
2 FSD 
Failure to start on 
demand 
Protection device/circuit 
breaker/switch fails after a 
circuit fault 
   
3 FFAI Fuel Failure Missing or Unusable Fuel X   
2 GFAI Gas Failure Gas Failure    
1 NETF 
Internet Network 
Failure 
Temporary or permanent 
Inoperable Internet Net-
work 
   
1 MUDA Mud accumulation Mud accumulation    
2 SINF 
Synchronization 
Failed 
Unable to synchronize the 
generator 
X   
13 UPF 
Upstream Power 
Failure 
Failure in Energy Supply X   
3 WATF Water Failure Missing or Unusable water    
0 SENSF Sensor failure 
Sensor, camera or similar 
equipment malfunction 
   
0 DBAT Damaged Battery 
Inoperative Battery or Low 
Capacity 
   
0 STOP Locked / Stop 
Component unable to func-
tion, locked or jammed 
   
3 UNK Other / Unknown 
Failure modes not speci-
fied, too little information 
to set a failure mode, Spec-
ify in comment field 
X X X 
 
  
 
5 This table is not complete and does not have all the components with their respective failure modes. 
The complete one is displayed in Annex C.  
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
 
5.  Results Analysis 
After ensuring that it is possible to apply the chosen metric to the infrastructure and after 
characterizing all the components, according to the factors previously described in the develop-
ment chapter, the final phase would have to be the Results Analysis. This chapter aims to calculate 
the final resilience values of the events that have occurred and other random events for test effects. 
The final values are going to be displayed and discussed in order to understand if they match the 
intended results. All the necessary details will be presented to clarify possible doubts and to bring 
clarity to this process. 
5.1. Calculus of the final Resilience Values 
Since all the values obtained were already close to what would be expected, the Resili-
ence loss caused by the impact of each of the failures in the last year was calculated. To make this 
possible, it was necessary to identify which component was affected by each event and the time 
that elapsed between the beginning of the event and the end of it. A new list was created to analyze 
all the necessary information and to try to comprehend the impact of that event considering his 
characteristics. 
So, table 23 will show the calculated resilience losses after each event. Some information 
about each event (as the ratings assigned to each of the factors of the component affected by the 
event) will be put aside to respect company's policies. The last line will show the final results 
with two type of results to be compared. The first results will recur to the applied metric (with the 
Poisson Process) and the others do not consider the Poisson Process and the planning horizon. 
Those results obey to the next formulas:  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑅𝑓) =
(𝑡𝑟−𝑡𝑖)(𝑄100−𝑄𝑟)
2𝑄100𝑡
  (25) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑅𝑒) = 1 − exp [−𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅)] + exp[−𝜆𝑡]       (26) 
 
 
5 
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Table 23 - Final Resilience values from the failure events occurred in a year 
      With Poisson Process Without Poisson Process 
𝑁𝑜 𝑅𝑃𝑁 𝐼𝐺𝑆 𝑃 ∆𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅ 𝐶𝑅1 𝐿𝑅1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅1 𝐶𝑅2 𝐿𝑅2 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅2 
June 2018 
1 0.232 0.768 3 1 0.00064 0.99996 0.00004 0.99996 0.99977 0.00023 0.99977 
2 0.232 0.768 3 3 0.00191 0.99988 0.00012 0.99983 0.99930 0.00070 0.99906 
3 0.232 0.768 3 2 0.00127 0.99992 0.00008 0.99975 0.99953 0.00047 0.99860 
4 0.232 0.768 3 1 0.00064 0.99996 0.00004 0.99971 0.99977 0.00023 0.99836 
5 0.098 0.902 4 1 0.00027 0.99998 0.00002 0.99969 0.99990 0.00010 0.99826 
      Total 8 0.00472  0.00031 0.99969  0.00174 0.99826 
July 2018 
6 0.07 0.93 5 1 0.00019 0.99999 0.00001 0.99968 0.99993 0.00007 0.99819 
7 0.399 0.601 2 1 0.00109 0.99993 0.00007 0.99961 0.99960 0.00040 0.99779 
      Total 2 0.00128  0.00008 0.99961  0.00047 0.99779 
August 2018 
8 0.232 0.768 3 1 0.00064 0.99996 0.00004 0.99957 0.99977 0.00023 0.99756 
      Total 1 0.00064  0.00004 0.99957  0.00023 0.99756 
September 2018 
9 0.57 0.43 2 5 0.00781 0.99949 0.00051 0.99906 0.99712 0.00288 0.99467 
10 0.399 0.601 2 1 0.00109 0.99993 0.00007 0.99899 0.99960 0.00040 0.99427 
      Total 6 0.00890  0.00058 0.99899  0.00329 0.99427 
October 2018 
11 0.29 0.71 3 10 0.00795 0.99948 0.00052 0.99847 0.99707 0.00293 0.99134 
12 0.7 0.3 1 1 0.00192 0.99987 0.00013 0.99834 0.99929 0.00071 0.99063 
      Total 11 0.00986  0.00064 0.99834  0.00364 0.99063 
November 2018 
13 0.399 0.601 2 1 0.00109 0.99993 0.00007 0.99827 0.99960 0.00040 0.99023 
      Total 1 0.00109  0.00007 0.99827  0.00040 0.99023 
December 2018 
14 0.399 0.601 2 5 0.00547 0.99964 0.00036 0.99791 0.99798 0.00202 0.98821 
15 0.035 0.965 5 1 0.00010 0.99999 0.00001 0.99791 0.99996 0.00004 0.98818 
16 0.57 0.43 2 5 0.00781 0.99949 0.00051 0.99740 0.99712 0.00288 0.98529 
      Total 11 0.01337  0.00087 0.99740  0.00494 0.98529 
From January to March 2019 
17 0.232 0.768 3 1 0.00064 0.99996 0.00004 0.99736 0.99977 0.00023 0.98509 
18 0.232 0.768 3 10 0.00636 0.99959 0.00041 0.99695 0.99765 0.00235 0.98275 
19 0.399 0.601 2 30 0.03279 0.99786 0.00214 0.99480 0.98774 0.01226 0.97048 
      Total 41 0.03979  0.00260 0.99480  0.01484 0.97048 
March 2019 
20 0.7 0.3 1 2 0.00384 0.99975 0.00025 0.99455 0.99859 0.00141 0.96907 
      Total 2 0.00384  0.00025 0.99455  0.00141 0.96907 
Final Results 
   Total 83 8%  0.545% 99.455%  3.097% 96.903% 
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In this table, the following acronyms represent: 
• 𝑁𝑜 = Corresponds to the occurrence and order by which them occurred; 
• 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = Risk Priority Number; 
• 𝐼𝐺𝑆 = Infrastructure's General State; 
• 𝑃 = Priority; 
• ∆𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒=  Corresponds to the time occurred between the beginning of the event and the 
end of it (𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖); 
• 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅ = Non-Resilience per Failure; 
• 𝐶𝑅𝑥 = The Calculated Resilience obtained by formulas (25) and (26), which are the 
same as formulas (5) and (6). It corresponds to 𝐶𝑅1 and 𝐶𝑅2 respectively; 
• 𝐿𝑅𝑥 = Loss of Resilience, obtained by subtracting 1 to the previously calculated value, 
which corresponds to 𝐿𝑅1 and 𝐿𝑅2 respectively; 
• 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅𝑥 = Combined Resilience corresponds to subtracting 𝐿𝑅𝑥 from 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅𝑥−1, 
originating 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅𝑥. 
 
 
Figure 20 - Resilience drop over a year, per month, recurring to the Poisson Process 
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Figure 21 - Resilience drop over a year, per event, recurring to the Poisson Process 
 These latter graphs (figure 20 and 21) refer to the resilience lost, throughout a year, of 
the analyzed infrastructure. By analyzing them, it is possible to understand that the resilience drop 
is greater depending on the impact that the event has had on the infrastructure. Both graphs show 
that January was the month with the biggest drop and was due to the fact that those were the 
months with the highest failure impact. 
5.2. Obtained Results 
Given the obtained results, it is possible to immediately compare them since they are 
quite discrepant. The combined loss of resilience over a year, using the Poisson process (0.545%), 
seems to be close to reality, therefore, losing the same amount of resilience in 10 years would be 
5.45%. By not recurring to the Poisson variable, a value of 3.0966% per year would be obtained. 
Therefore, by applying the same method of considering the same loss of resilience per year in a 
10 years span, this value would be at 30.966%. Those results seem unlikely to occur since, under 
these conditions, the probability that the infrastructure is profitable would be very low, making it 
an unwanted business to the company. 
Table 24 - Resilience Results considering and not considering Poisson 
Final Results 
With Poisson Process Without Poisson Process 
Combined Loss of 
Resilience 
Final Resilience value 
Combined Loss of 
Resilience 
Final Resilience value 
0.5452145% 99.4554113% 3.0965816% 96.9034184% 
However, even though the results would seem to go accordingly to what was expected, it 
was decided to test other possible events to see if the results would remain consistent. It was 
decided to choose elements that had different Risk Priority Number's in order to not test values 
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that were close and to try the different types of failure so that it was possible to compare the final 
values. This process was necessary to comprehend if this factor would make a significant differ-
ence in this process. The chosen equipment were Power Plugs (3.5% RPN), Battery Cabinets 
(28.5% RPN), LVDB (39.9% RPN), Chiller (70% RPN) and Isolation Transformer (100% RPN) 
and they will be presented respectively by this order, in table 25. So, to each of these equipment 
3 results were obtained, knowing that each of these had a different type of failure and timeline.  
By looking at table 23 and figure 25, it can be observed that the results are in line with 
what was expected and that a clear distinction can be made between a type 3 failure event and a 
type 1 failure event, thus proving the importance of this factor to the system. It is important to 
state that in table 25, the 𝑇 stands for Type of Failure and events no 1,4,7,10 and 13 are failures 
of type 1, events no 2,5,8,11 and 14 are failures of type 2 and events no 3,6,9,12 and 15 are failures 
of type 3. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that using the initially proposed metric allows to 
obtain values that are much closer to reality and that provide an interesting indicator, to the infra-
structure manager, by setting annual targets to meet company's expectations. It can also allow a 
new level of analysis by attempting to understand if it is in any way feasible, after a disruptive 
event, to: repair the affected equipment, replace the affected equipment with an equivalent or 
replace the affected equipment with a higher quality one. 
Table 25 - Final Resilience values from the simulated events 
       With Poisson Process Without Poisson Process 
𝑁𝑜 𝑇 𝑅𝑃𝑁 𝐼𝐺𝑆 𝑃 ∆𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑓̅̅ ̅ 𝐶𝑅1 𝐿𝑅1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅1 𝐶𝑅2 𝐿𝑅2 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑅2 
Equipment: Power Plugs; Level: D; Significance: 3; Redundancy: N 
1 1 0.035 0.965 5 1 0.000096 0.999994 0.000006 0.999994 0.999965 0.000035 0.999965 
2 2 0.0175 0.9825 5 2 0.000096 0.999994 0.000006 0.999994 0.999965 0.000035 0.999965 
 3 3 0.00875 0.99125 5 3 0.000072 0.999995 0.000005 0.999995 0.999974 0.000026 0.999974 
Equipment: Battery Cabinets; Level: B; Significance: 2; Redundancy: S(2N) 
4 1 0.285 0.715 3 1 0.000781 0.999949 0.000051 0.999949 0.999713 0.000287 0.999713 
5 2 0.1425 0.8575 4 2 0.000781 0.999949 0.000051 0.999949 0.999713 0.000287 0.999713 
6 3 0.07125 0.92875 5 3 0.000586 0.999962 0.000038 0.999962 0.999785 0.000215 0.999785 
Equipment: LVDB; Level: B; Significance: 1; Redundancy: S(2N) 
7 1 0.399 0.601 2 1 0.001093 0.999929 0.000071 0.999929 0.999598 0.000402 0.999598 
8 2 0.1995 0.8005 3 2 0.001093 0.999929 0.000071 0.999929 0.999598 0.000402 0.999598 
9 3 0.09975 0.90025 4 3 0.000820 0.999946 0.000054 0.999946 0.999698 0.000302 0.999698 
Equipment: Chiller; Level: A; Significance: 1; Redundancy: S(2N) 
10 1 0.7 0.3 1 1 0.001918 0.99987 0.00013 0.99987 0.99929 0.00071 0.99929 
11 2 0.35 0.65 2 2 0.001918 0.99987 0.00013 0.99987 0.99929 0.00071 0.99929 
12 3 0.175 0.825 3 3 0.001438 0.99991 0.00009 0.99991 0.99947 0.00053 0.99947 
Equipment: Isolation Transformer; Level: A; Significance: 1; Redundancy: N 
13 1 1 0 1 1 0.002740 0.999821 0.000179 0.999821 0.998991 0.001009 0.998991 
14 2 0.5 0.5 2 2 0.002740 0.999821 0.000179 0.999821 0.998991 0.001009 0.998991 
15 3 0.25 0.75 3 3 0.002055 0.999866 0.000134 0.999866 0.999243 0.000757 0.999243 
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Figure 22 - Resilience lost per event, from the simulated events (w/ Poisson Process) 
All of these options can and should account the possible impact that an equipment has 
had on the loss of resilience, considering its characteristics and the length of time it has remained 
inoperative. However, the obtained value recurring to Poisson (0.545%) does not mean that the 
infrastructure has lost its performance capability. Figure 23 allows us to conclude that there are 
several different ways for an infrastructure to lose performance and recover it after an event. It is, 
therefore, possible to affirm that:  
• By replacing the affected equipment with a better than the previous one, it can be 
considered that the building's Performance has gone to a better state than the previ-
ous one; 
• By replacing the affected equipment with equipment as good as the previous one, it 
can be considered that the building's performance has maintained its previous level 
of performance; 
• By repairing the affected equipment, it could be considered that the infrastructure 
would be in an as good as old situation, so possible aging effects on that equipment 
would have to be considered. 
Therefore, taking into account the results obtained in table 23, and after analyzing all the 
values obtained in the simulations performed in table 25, it is possible to state that the values are 
in accordance with what is intended and that the results are quite satisfactory since they make it 
possible to sort all the components analyzed in a consistent manner with the concerned infrastruc-
ture and the company responsible for it. In this way, the company can have in its possession a 
tool that will make it possible to create a data history that allows it to evaluate, through a quanti-
fiable value, all the events that take place over time. This will enable to more accurately assess 
all future decisions on equipment, components or even an area of the infrastructure that has been 
affected. 
0
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Figure 23 - Proposed definitions of Resilience Metrics [26] 
This system also has the ability to shape and adapt to other infrastructures after making 
the necessary adjustments. Like it was previously shown, the attributed values of the factors for 
a piece of equipment may depend on his specifications or characteristics and it is feasible that an 
equipment may have different characteristics in different infrastructures. For example, a type 1 
failure in a diesel storage tank in the analyzed infrastructure has an RPN of 28.5% as it has no 
redundancy. If there is another infrastructure that has a diesel tank with redundancy levels of N + 
1 or 2N, it will get an RPN of 22.8% or 19.95%, respectively, if the other factors maintain their 
values. 
It can then be concluded that the chosen metric and the processes used to calculate the 
impact of an event on the resilience of a building goes in accordance to what was intended, provid-
ing an important tool not only for the building management team but also for other personnel, 
responsible to evaluate its performance over time. 
5.3. Tool Assumptions and method of Operation 
In order to summarize the functioning and to mention the most important aspects to be 
considered for the implementation of this event reporting methodology, it is important to start by 
remembering the Resilience Analysis Process, explained in chapter 2.3.1. This process draws 
attention to factors that should be considered, ranging from the financial, legislative and local 
factors to the more technical part. The final objectives and the level of pretended resilience can 
vary depending on the location and the entities involved. 
So, the first objective should be defining Resilience targets and goals, as chapter 2.3.1.1, 
“Define Resilience Goals”, states. The other steps will be referred to over the next points. There-
fore, to explain the possible functioning of this tool, throughout an event, a demonstrative diagram 
will be presented (figure 24) with the following steps that were considered: 
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• Incident identification: The technician, who is responsible for reporting the incident 
identifies in the system, which component was affected to automatically obtain its 
failure mode, level, significance, and redundancy. 
• Categorization: After obtaining the affected component values, the technician char-
acterizes the type of failure deterministically, with the range previously described in 
chapter 3.2.1.4. in order to obtain the necessary RPN. Then, the Failure Modes table 
is used to describe the event. If necessary, some commentaries can be added to better 
describe the occurred event. This point is close to the one explained in RAP’s 4th 
Step, "Determine Level of Disruption", chapter 2.3.1.4. 
• Prioritization: The system, through the RPN classification, will try to classify the 
event according to its importance. If this is the only active event, it will appear as 
the only event to be resolved as there is no other process in progress. If there are 
other events that are still in the resolution process, the system itself will rearrange to 
prioritize events considering their RPN's. 
• Response and Diagnosis: Decision-making managers will need to assess what action 
is going to be taken and evaluate the event. The response shall be in accordance with 
the severity parameters previously characterized in chapter 3.2.2. where a level 5 
event can be resolved over a longer period of time and a level 1 event is of the utmost 
emergency. 
• Resolution and Recovery: In this time, measures have to be presented to control and 
prevent further damage. The first actions must be taken in order to resume activities 
and go back to previous levels as soon as possible. 
• Closure: After all resolution processes are completed and the event is resolved, the 
event is closed and terminated in the system. Then it will be possible to calculate the 
final value of resilience lost with this event, as it depends on its start and completion 
time. It should be evaluated, at this moment, whether all the steps and decisions taken 
throughout the event are in accordance with what is intended or if any decision has 
affected the normal functioning of the infrastructure. It is also important to reevalu-
ate if the previously set annual targets are still viable. The 6th and 7th chapter 2.3.1.6. 
"Calculate Consequences and Resilience Metrics" and chapter 2.3.1.7. “Evaluate 
Resilience Improvements” are very similar to this point. 
 
Figure 24 - Demonstrative diagram of the proposed steps to take when an incident occurs 
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6.  Conclusions 
The main objective of this dissertation was the construction of a system that could quan-
tify a disruptive event according to its impact and severity. This would always aim to achieve a 
greater economic efficiency on the part of the company where this system was applied.  
The research phase was more time consuming and complicated than expected as the com-
pany did not have a built idea of how to reach the desired solution. Intensive research was made 
to find a solution that could provide the company with a system that was easy to understand, that 
offered a value that made sense, and that allowed an in-depth analysis of an event to meet what 
was intended. 
After this phase was completed, the development of the methodology started. One of the 
first challenges was that the historical data of past disruptive events was considerably small, and 
the time sample was discrete (since ∆𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 are presented in days, not hours). A continuous-time 
sample with more events would contribute considerably to safer and more concrete values. How-
ever, as it was proved that there were no tests that rejected the hypothesis of applying this metric, 
it was possible to continue developing it. 
The obtained values of past events and simulations made possible to conclude that this 
tool can be very interesting for the company. It is possible to create annual targets in order to 
evaluate if the performance of the infrastructure in question is within the desired parameters, or, 
if it is more reasonable to replace a component instead of repairing it, if the resolution time after 
an error was too big. 
Even knowing that this system only has the ability to evaluate the impact of an event after 
that it has occurred, its implementation can also contribute to the decrease of disruptive events in 
a medium or long term. Creating annual targets and having a more detailed data history of the 
impact and duration of each event can contribute to greater attention from all of those involved 
in the infrastructure maintenance and management teams, and even create new preventive habits 
and processes that may mitigate the possibility of an occurring event. 
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Applying this system on infrastructures does not invalidate the use of predictive models 
that recur to Artificial Intelligence or Decision Trees that can predict the existence of an event or 
how to act when facing factors that may jeopardize the correct functioning of system infrastruc-
ture. All of these technologies combined can improve the performance of infrastructure. 
This system also offers the possibility to apply it to other infrastructures, after applying 
all the necessary changes regarding the four previously proposed factors and by confirming if it 
is possible to apply the metric by checking if the Poisson Process still applies, giving the company 
the possibility to create a broader track record in a set of several infrastructures. Sharing this type 
of information between infrastructures can contribute to better overall performance on a piece of 
equipment and improve the failure mode table with new failures that may have occurred else-
where. 
The direct contact with technicians and management teams made it possible to clarify 
some doubts that were crucial to a correct understanding of the infrastructure in question. The 
visualization of associated documentation, such as technical reports, and visits to the infrastruc-
ture gave a clearer idea of some of the recurring problems and allowed the acquisition of various 
technical and business knowledge. 
For the reasons mentioned above, it can be concluded that all the objectives outlined for 
this dissertation were successfully achieved and all the steps and explanations have been taken in 
order to successfully apply to this system.  
As future work, it should also be noted that it is important to make annual adjustments to 
the values of the resilience calculation variables, namely the 𝜆. The existence of a larger sample, 
and preferably a continuous-time sample, enables a safer 𝜆 value that can be increasingly closer 
to reality. It is important to note that although the degree of accuracy of the system corresponds 
to the expected results, improving the RPN's values throughout the time it is an important step to 
improve the accuracy of the obtained results. Also, improving the failure mode table to make it 
as complete and as clear as possible is an important step. 
As times goes by, there might be a need to add new variables to the Model, bringing new 
challenges to the analyst to the possible descriptions and characteristics of the variable. As such, 
variables such as occurrence and uncertainty may be considered in the future, where: 
• Occurrence - Probability of a fatality or a failure occurring in a component for a given 
reason. Should a UPS fail (which is very rare) an extra rating could be attributed to it. 
However, does it make sense that the weight to be assigned is greater for components 
that are less likely to occur? 
• Uncertainty - If an accident has occurred in a certain stage or a certain component and 
if in a certain period immediately before the accident there were more incidents, then 
the final weight of the incident can increase because the second incident can be a con-
sequence of the first. 
 67 
 
Bibliography 
[1] International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook Special Report,” World Energy 
Outlook Spec. Rep., pp. 1–200, 2015. 
[2] S. Kramer and S. Engell, Resource Efficiency of Processing Plants. Weinheim, Germany: 
Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2018. 
[3] P. Torcellini, S. Pless, and M. Deru, “Zero Energy Buildings: A Critical Look at the 
Definition,” Springer New York, New York, NY, 2006. 
[4] S. Attia et al., “Overview and future challenges of nearly zero energy buildings (nZEB) 
design in Southern Europe,” Energy Build., vol. 155, no. September, pp. 439–458, 2017. 
[5] E. Vugrin, A. Castillo, and C. Silva-monroy, “Resilience Metrics for the Electric Power 
System : A Performance-Based Approach,” no. February, p. 49, 2017. 
[6] K. E. Trenberth, L. Cheng, P. Jacobs, Y. Zhang, and J. Fasullo, “Hurricane Harvey Links 
to Ocean Heat Content and Climate Change Adaptation,” Earth’s Futur., vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 
730–744, 2018. 
[7] “Warming seas may increase frequency of extreme storms – Climate Change: Vital Signs 
of the Planet,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2837/warming-
seas-may-increase-frequency-of-extreme-storms/. 
[8] “Staten Island seawall: Designing for climate change - CNN Style,” 2019. [Online]. 
Available: https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/staten-island-seawall-climate-crisis-
design/index.html. 
[9] Z. Bie, Y. Lin, G. Li, and F. Li, “Battling the Extreme: A Study on the Power System 
Resilience,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 105, no. 7, pp. 1253–1266, 2017. 
[10] M. Bevilacqua, F. E. Ciarapica, and G. Marcucci, “Supply Chain Resilience Triangle: The 
Study and Development of a Framework,” World Acad. Sci. Eng. Technol. Int. J. Soc. 
Behav. Educ. Econ. Bus. Ind. Eng., vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 2046–2053, 2017. 
[11] S. Hosseini, K. Barker, and J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, “A review of definitions and measures 
of system resilience,” Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., vol. 145, pp. 47–61, Jan. 2016. 
[12] L. Layton, L. T. Marques, D. Shirmohammadi, H. W. Hong, A. Semlyen, and G. X. Luo, 
“Electric System Reliability Indices,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 3, no. 21, p. 12, 2004. 
[13] Y. Sheffi and J. Rice Jr, “A Supply Chain View of the Resilient Enterprise,” MIT Sloan 
Manag. Rev., vol. 47, 2005. 
[14] M. Panteli and P. Mancarella, “The Grid: Stronger, Bigger, Smarter?,” IEEE Power 
Energy Mag., vol. 13, no. june, pp. 58–66, 2015. 
[15] A. Clark-Ginsberg, “What’s the difference between Reliability and Resilience?,” 
Technical Report, 2016. 
[16] E. Office and P. August, “White House 2013 - Grid Resiliency and Economic Benefit,” 
Technical Report, 2013. 
[17] B. Bayer, P. Matschoss, H. Thomas, and A. Marian, “The German experience with 
integrating photovoltaic systems into the low-voltage grids,” Renew. Energy, vol. 119, pp. 
 68 
 
129–141, Apr. 2018. 
[18] K. Eshghi, B. K. Johnson, and C. G. Rieger, “Power system protection and resilient 
metrics,” in Proceedings - 2015 Resilience Week, RSW 2015, 2015, pp. 212–219. 
[19] C. H. and L. P. W. JP Watson, “Conceptual framework for developing resilience metrics 
for the electricity, oil, and gas sectors in the United States,” Energy.Gov, pp. SAND2014-
18019, 2015. 
[20] Adam Henshall, “FMEA: How to Prevent the £100m British Airways Catastrophe | 
Process Street | Checklist, Workflow and SOP Software,” 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.process.st/fmea/. 
[21] E. Pazireh, A. H. Sadeghi, and S. Shokohyar, “Analyzing the enhancement of production 
efficiency using FMEA through simulation-based optimization technique: A case study in 
apparel manufacturing,” Cogent Eng., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1–12, 2017. 
[22] S. Hosseini, K. Barker, and J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, “A review of definitions and measures 
of system resilience,” Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., vol. 145, pp. 47–61, 2016. 
[23] M. Bruneau et al., “A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic 
Resilience of Communities,” Earthq. Spectra, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 733–752, Nov. 2003. 
[24] C. W. Zobel, “Representing perceived tradeoffs in defining disaster resilience,” Decis. 
Support Syst., vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 394–403, Jan. 2011. 
[25] S. Enjalbert, F. Vanderhaegen, M. Pichon, K. A. Ouedraogo, and P. Millot, “Assessment 
of Transportation System Resilience,” in Human Modelling in Assisted Transportation, 
Milano: Springer Milan, 2011, pp. 335–341. 
[26] B. M. Ayyub, “Practical Resilience Metrics for Planning, Design, and Decision Making,” 
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertain. Eng. Syst. Part A Civ. Eng., vol. 1, no. 3, p. 04015008, 
2015. 
[27] “FERC: Critical Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information (CEII),” 2018. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.ferc.gov/legal/ceii-foia/ceii.asp. 
[28] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience,” 2013. 
[29] T. D. O’Rourke, “Infrastructure Interdependencies and Resilience,” in Chile Earthquake 
of 2010, Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, pp. 365–386. 
[30] M. Amin, “Toward self-healing energy infrastructure systems,” IEEE Comput. Appl. 
Power, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 20–28, 2001. 
[31] S. M. Rinaldi, “Modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and their 
interdependencies,” 37th Annu. Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci. 2004. Proc., vol. 00, no. C, p. 
8 pp., 2004. 
[32] Y. H. Khalil, A. Elmaghraby, and A. Kumar, “Evaluation of resilience for data center 
systems,” Proc. - IEEE Symp. Comput. Commun., pp. 340–345, 2008. 
[33] C. Harvey, “What is a Data Center?,” 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.datamation.com/data-center/what-is-data-center.html. 
[34] L. Uptime Institute, “Data Center Site Infrastructure Tier Standard : Operational 
Sustainability,” 2010. 
[35] A. Lawrence, C. Brown, and T. Traver, “Webinar: Data Center Outage Trends, Causes 
and Costs,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https://uptimeinstitute.com/webinars/webinar-
 69 
 
data-center-outage-trends-causes-and-updates. 
[36] W. Koehrsen, “The Poisson Distribution and Poisson Process Explained,” 2019. [Online]. 
Available: https://towardsdatascience.com/the-poisson-distribution-and-poisson-process-
explained-4e2cb17d459. 
[37] The British Standards, Petroleum, petrochemichal and natural gas industries — 
Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment (ISO 
14224:2016). 2016. 
[38] R. E. Walpole, R. H. Myers, S. L. Myers, and K. Ye, Probability & Statistics for Engineers 
& Scientists, 9th ed. Prentice Hall, 2012. 
[39] “NIST/SEMATECH e-Handbook of Statistical Methods,” 2003. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/index.htm. 
[40] “Symmetry, Skewness and Kurtosis | Real Statistics Using Excel,” 2014. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.real-statistics.com/descriptive-statistics/symmetry-skewness-
kurtosis/. 
[41] “Skewness of Data | Excel with Excel Master,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://excelmaster.co/skewness-of-data/. 
[42] P. H. Furfey and S. Siegel, “Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences,” Am. 
Cathol. Sociol. Rev., vol. 18, no. 2, p. 163, 2007. 
[43] P. D. T. O’Connor and A. Kleyner, “Appendix 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tables,” Pract. 
Reliab. Eng., pp. 455–456, 2011. 
[44] INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION. ISO 
14224:1999(E), Petroleum and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of 
reliability and maintenance data for equipment, vol. 1999. 1999. 
[45] G. Farquharson, “HVAC Systems Failure Modes,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.pharmout.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/2015_GMP_Validation_Forum_D1.T2.3.2-GJF-T2-04-HVAC-
Failure-Modes-2015-07-05.pdf. 
[46] M. Kamutzki, “Fan failures: five typical problems and what causes them,” 2016. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.plant.ca/features/163687/. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 72 
 
Annex A – Auxiliary Calibration Tables  
As it was described in chapter 4.3.2. a calibration was performed to analyze if the values 
were according to what was expected. So, every auxiliary table with the analyzed results that were 
not displayed previously are going to be presented. Once again, the colors used in these tables 
match those described in chapter 3.2.2. and in table 9. 
Table 26 - The Possible Results of Multiplying every Level value by every Redundancy value 
1st value: Level 
3rd value: Redundancy 
N N+1 2N 
1 0.8 0.7 
A 1 1 0.8 0.7 
B 0.57 0.57 0.456 0.399 
C 0.29 0.29 0.232 0.203 
D 0.14 0.14 0.112 0.098 
 
Table 27 - The Possible Results of Multiplying every Significance value by every Redundancy value 
2nd value: Signifi-
cance 
3rd value: Redundancy 
N N+1 2N 
1 0.8 0.7 
1 1 1 0.8 0.7 
2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.35 
3 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.175 
 
Table 28 - The Possible Results of multiplying every Level value by the multiplied results of table 
27 
1st value: Level 
2nd value: Significance × Redundancy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.25 0.2 0.175 
A 1 1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.35 0.25 0.2 0.175 
B 0.57 0.57 0.456 0.399 0.285 0.228 0.1995 0.1425 0.114 0.09975 
C 0.29 0.29 0.232 0.203 0.145 0.116 0.1015 0.0725 0.058 0.05075 
D 0.14 0.14 0.112 0.098 0.07 0.056 0.049 0.035 0.028 0.0245 
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Table 29 - The Possible Results of multiplying every Significance value by the multiplied results of 
table 26 
Level × Redun-
dancy 
2nd value: Significance 
1 2 3 
1 0.5 0.25 
1 1 0.5 0.25 
0.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 
0.7 0.7 0.35 0.175 
0.57 0.57 0.285 0.1425 
0.456 0.456 0.228 0.114 
0.399 0.399 0.1995 0.09975 
0.29 0.29 0.145 0.0725 
0.232 0.232 0.116 0.058 
0.203 0.203 0.1015 0.05075 
0.14 0.14 0.07 0.035 
0.112 0.112 0.056 0.028 
0.098 0.098 0.049 0.0245 
 
Table 30 - The Possible Results of multiplying every Significance value by the multiplied results of 
the multiplication between Level and Significance (displayed on table 19) 
Level × Signifi-
cance 
3rd value: Redundancy 
N N+1 2N 
1 0.8 0.7 
1 1 0.8 0.7 
0.57 0.57 0.456 0.399 
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.35 
0.29 0.29 0.232 0.203 
0.285 0.285 0.228 0.1995 
0.25 0.25 0.2 0.175 
0.145 0.145 0.116 0.1015 
0.1425 0.1425 0.114 0.09975 
0.14 0.14 0.112 0.098 
0.0725 0.0725 0.058 0.05075 
0.07 0.07 0.056 0.049 
0.035 0.035 0.028 0.0245 
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Annex B – The resulting RPN’s 
As described in chapter 4.3, it was necessary to characterize all the components in order 
to obtain their respective RPN's. Therefore, a more complete table similar to table 16 and 17 was 
created containing all the obtained classifications with the different types of failure. As in the 
above tables, the types of equipment will be as described in that chapter. The utilized colors will 
match those described in chapter 3.2.2. and in table 9. Some of the utilized acronyms were: 
• 𝐿 = Level; 
• 𝑆 = Significance; 
• 𝑅 = Redundancy; 
• 𝑅𝑃𝑁 = Risk Priority Number; 
• 𝐼𝐺𝑆 = Infrastructure’s General State; 
• 𝑃 = Priority. 
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Table 31 - The complete table with the Resulting RPN's from each component 
Data Center Type of Failure: 1 Type of Failure: 2 Type of Failure: 3 
Type of 
Equi-
pment 
Equipment Failure Mode L S R RPN IGS P RPN IGS P RPN IGS P 
En
e
rg
y 
Disconnector Disconnector A 1 2N 70.00% 30.00% 1 35.00% 65.00% 2 17.50% 82.50% 3 
Generator Gerador A 1 2N 70.00% 30.00% 1 35.00% 65.00% 2 17.50% 82.50% 3 
Transformer Transformer A 1 2N 70.00% 30.00% 1 35.00% 65.00% 2 17.50% 82.50% 3 
LVDB LVDB B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
UPS UPS B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
Rectifier Rectifier B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
UPS's DB Distribution Boards B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
DB Distribution Boards C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
Diesel Storage Tanks Storage Tanks B 2 N 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 7.13% 92.88% 5 
Battery Cabinets Battery Cabinets B 2 N 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 7.13% 92.88% 5 
Isolation Transformer Transformer C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
Power Plugs Power Plugs D 3 N 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 0.88% 99.13% 5 
H
V
A
C
 
Chiller  Chiller  A 1 2N 70.00% 30.00% 1 35.00% 65.00% 2 17.50% 82.50% 3 
Boilers Boilers A 1 2N 70.00% 30.00% 1 35.00% 65.00% 2 17.50% 82.50% 3 
HVAC's DB Distribution Boards B 2 N 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 7.13% 92.88% 5 
Water Distribution Network Hydraulic System B 2 N 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 7.13% 92.88% 5 
Water Storage Tanks Storage Tanks A 3 N 25.00% 75.00% 3 12.50% 87.50% 4 6.25% 93.75% 5 
Fresh Air Handling Unit AHU C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
VRV Split / VRV C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
High Pressure Air Handling Unit AHU C 1 N+1 23.20% 76.80% 3 11.60% 88.40% 4 5.80% 94.20% 5 
SPLIT Split / VRV D 1 N 14.00% 86.00% 4 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 
Fan Coil Unit Fan Coil Unit D 2 N 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 
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Data Center Type of Failure: 1 Type of Failure: 2 Type of Failure: 3 
Type of 
Equi-
pment 
Equipment Failure Mode L S R RPN IGS P RPN IGS P RPN IGS P 
H
V
A
C
 
Water Pump Pumps D 1 2N 9.80% 90.20% 4 4.90% 95.10% 5 2.45% 97.55% 5 
Heat exchanger Heat exchanger D 3 N 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 0.88% 99.13% 5 
Heaters Heaters D 3 N 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 0.88% 99.13% 5 
Fans Fans D 3 N 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 0.88% 99.13% 5 
Em
e
rg
e
n
cy
 
Isolation Transformer Transformer A 1 N 100.00% 0.00% 1 50.00% 50.00% 2 25.00% 75.00% 3 
Security DB Distribution Boards B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
Fire Alarm Control Unit FACU B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
Automatic Fire Suppression System FACU B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
Emergency Electric Pumps Pumps B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
Motor Pumps Motor Pumps B 1 2N 39.90% 60.10% 2 19.95% 80.05% 3 9.98% 90.03% 4 
Centralized Technical Management Sys-
tems 
CTMS B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
CCTV Systems CCTV B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
Fire Aspiration Detection System FADS C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
Flood Detection System FACU C 1 N 29.00% 71.00% 3 14.50% 85.50% 4 7.25% 92.75% 5 
Intrusion Alarms IAL B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
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Data Center Type of Failure: 1 Type of Failure: 2 Type of Failure: 3 
Type of 
Equi-
pment 
Equipment Failure Mode L S R RPN IGS P RPN IGS P RPN IGS P 
Em
e
rg
e
n
cy
 Gas Detection Systems GDS B 1 N 57.00% 43.00% 2 28.50% 71.50% 3 14.25% 85.75% 4 
Fire Extinguishers Fire Extinguishers D 1 N 14.00% 86.00% 4 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 
Fire Hose Reels Fire Hose Reels D 1 N 14.00% 86.00% 4 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 
Cylinders for Automatic Fire Suppres-
sion 
Cylinders for Automatic Fire Suppres-
sion 
D 1 N 14.00% 86.00% 4 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 
O
th
e
rs
 
Wiring Closet Wiring Closet D 1 2N 9.80% 90.20% 4 4.90% 95.10% 5 2.45% 97.55% 5 
PDU PDU D 2 N 7.00% 93.00% 5 3.50% 96.50% 5 1.75% 98.25% 5 
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Annex C – The Complete Failure Mode Table 
As described in chapter 4.4, a Failure Modes Table was created in order to better classify 
every event. This table is more complete version of table 22, presented in chapter 4.4, and will 
follow the same construction. Some of the utilized acronyms were: 
• Nº of implications per failure – Number of equipment where this fault can be found; 
• Failure Mode code - A unique code for each failure mode; 
• Description - Brief description about the detected problem; 
• Details - Brief description with some details of the failure that can help in the reporting 
phase of the event and to clarify a possible doubt; 
• Equipment class code - A unique code for each of the equipment. 
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Table 32 - The Complete Failure Mode Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
 
 
